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The U.S. military remains a premier conventional fighting force, but success in 
counterinsurgency has proved to be beyond its grasp on numerous occasions. 
Consequently, this research investigates preconditions that could increase the likelihood 
of success for a U.S.-supported counterinsurgency. The selected factors include the host 
government’s level of legitimacy, its capacity and willingness to deny sanctuary, and 
whether it shares key objectives with the United States. In all four cases of this 
comparative analysis, the United States functioned as the external supporter to the 
counterinsurgency forces. The cases include conflicts in the Philippines (2002–2014), El 
Salvador (1981–1992), Afghanistan (2001–2009), and Iraq (2003–2006). In the cases of 
the Philippines and El Salvador, both governments demonstrated a degree of legitimacy, 
the capacity and willingness to deny sanctuary, and shared critical objectives with the 
United States. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, both governments were relatively 
illegitimate and lacked the willingness and capacity to deny sanctuary. Moreover, while 
the host governments shared some objectives with the United States, the local 
populations did not embrace these ideals. Arguably, the Philippine and El Salvador cases 
reached acceptable outcomes, while the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends that the United States should not commit significant 
military support unless all three pre-conditions are satisfied. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Would the United States avoid entering into an irregular-warfare conflict knowing 
that a desirable outcome was unachievable? The aim of this research is to determine if 
certain critical preconditions in contemporary counterinsurgency conflicts preclude a 
satisfactory outcome. The ability to recognize and understand such preconditions should 
assist the United States in determining whether or not to support future counterinsurgency 
efforts. 
The current global threat environment makes this inquiry relevant for the 
foreseeable future.1 As senior civilian and military leaders acknowledge that 
conventional military superiority does not guarantee victory in irregular warfare, an 
analysis of the factors that tend to bring desired outcomes becomes critical. Rational 
states avoid involving themselves in conflicts where success is unobtainable. Therefore, 
they must recognize that there are certain circumstances, regardless of strategy, that make 
success highly improbable.  
This research studies recent cases in which the United States participated directly 
or indirectly in counterinsurgency actions. The cases are El Salvador (1981–1992), the 
Philippines (2002–2014), Afghanistan (2001–2009), and Iraq (2003–2006). U.S. 
counterinsurgency efforts in the Philippines2 and El Salvador, both of which were 
characterized by a limited employment of Army Special Forces,3 are generally assessed 
by military analysts as having reached successful outcomes. By contrast, U.S. actions in 
                                                 
1 Seth G. Jones, The Future of Irregular Warfare (testimony, Committee on Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities for the United States House of Representatives, 
Washington, DC, March 27, 2012). 1–2. 
2 Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: 
Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach,” Prism 3, no. 4 (September 2012): 132; Stephen Watts, Jason H. 
Campbell, Patrick B. Johnson, Sameer Lalwani, and Sarah H. Bana, Countering Others’ Insurgencies: 
Understanding U.S. Small Footprint Interventions in Local Context (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 
2014), 63; Brian M Burton, “The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach,” Prism 3, no. 1 (December 
2011): 50. 
3 Max Boot and Richard Bennett, “Treading Softly in the Philippines,” Weekly Standard 14, no.16 
(January 2009): 22–28; David S. Maxwell, “Partnership, Respect Guide U.S. Military Role in Philippines.” 
World Politics Review (February 2013): 4, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12685/partnership-
respect-guide-u-s-military-role-in-philippines.  
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Iraq failed to achieve desired results by the end of 2006, and the conflict in Afghanistan 
offers little hope for a successful conclusion unless significant policy adjustments are 
made.4 Both cases included a large military response in which Army Special Forces 
played a supporting role.  
Former advisor to the National Security Council, Edward Luttwak, suggest that 
the United States is largely unable to succeed in counterinsurgency, observing that the 
United States will always play to its strength—that is, its ability to overwhelm the enemy 
with massing forces and firepower.5 Experience shows that insurgents and 
counterinsurgents are in a battle for popular support—a battle the U.S. understands, but 
cannot seem to win. Moreover, large military responses may alienate a population, as 
opposed to building support.6 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the pre-conditions that increase the likelihood of success for a U.S.-
supported counterinsurgency?  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Drawing on general principles found in the literature on irregular warfare and 
counterinsurgency, this research identifies five preconditions for success in combating 
insurgency and evaluates their relative importance. A more extensive review of 
counterinsurgency literature that identified the preconditions is contained in the 
Appendix.  
C. PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
Given the trend to increasing U.S. support of insurgency-wracked countries, it is 
essential that the preconditions that strongly shape outcomes be understood. In the 20th 
                                                 
4 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s 
Longest War (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 211–212. 
5 Edward N. Luttwak, “Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Harper’s Magazine 2 
(2007): 41–42. 
6 Hy Rothstein, “Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of Collapsing 
States,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (February 2007): 275–294. 
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century, the U.S. view of intervention was predominantly shaped by Cold War 
considerations—namely, was it in our vital interests to prevent a country from falling to 
communist insurgents? Beyond this primary consideration, the nature of the host regime 
and insurgents, the geostrategic significance of the state and its relationship with the U.S., 
and the human cost of the insurgency affected the decision to support an action.7 While 
these factors remain relevant, key preconditions that may predict the potential for success 
also warrant analysis. By distilling these preconditions from the literature, this research 
offers a deeper understanding of the variables to consider in supporting a 
counterinsurgency.  
D. THE FIVE IDENTIFIED PRECONDITIONS  
This research is focused on pre-cursors to strategy—more specifically five 
preconditions for success. Ultimately, three are suggested as critical for a U.S. 
counterinsurgency effort. 
1. Legitimacy 
Governmental legitimacy is discussed extensively in the literature and is generally 
recognized as a critical component in any counterinsurgency effort.8 Legitimacy is 
derived from a population’s support of and regard for the government in response to its 
ability to meet basic subsistence needs, administer justice, and provide security. It must 
be stressed that the U.S. cannot create legitimacy for a government affected by 
insurgency.9 
In The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why 
the Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. 
                                                 
7 Raymond A. Millen and Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004), 18–19. 
8 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010); Hy Rothstein 
and John Arquilla, “Understanding the Afghan Challenge,” in Afghan Endgames Strategy and Policy 
Choices for America’s Longest War, eds. John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2012); John A. Nagl, James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall, and David Petraeus, The U.S. 
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008).  
9 Robert Reilly, “Shaping Strategic Communication,” in Afghan Endgames, eds. John Arquilla and Hy 
Rothstein (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 169–170. 
 4
Army in Afghanistan, Chris Mason borrows Max Weber’s definition of legitimacy as 
traditional, charismatic, or rational legal. Traditional legitimacy refers to the respect 
afforded to traditional authorities, including tribal leaders such as those found in 
southwest Asia and the Middle East.10 Charismatic legitimacy is linked to a specific 
person or ideology, often a religious leader. Rational legal legitimacy derives from a 
government’s adherence to institutionally enforced laws and regulations that are accepted 
by the people; this is the legitimacy that democratic governments enjoy.11 To understand 
the sources of legitimacy in a potential host country, cultural and historical analysis is 
required. For example, in Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s 
Longest War, Arquilla and Rothstein use Afghanistan to explain that elections and 
democracy, although seemingly legitimate from a Western perspective, do not necessarily 
coincide with how legitimacy is perceived in Afghanistan.12  
A government’s legitimacy is evaluated in relative terms; because many variables 
contribute to or detract from legitimacy, a government is rarely considered absolutely 
legitimate or illegitimate. In the context of a counterinsurgency, it is likely that the 
government is either the root problem or suffers from low popular perception of 
legitimacy. In the vast majority of modern prescriptive counterinsurgency strategy 
literature, the population is viewed as a primary focus of the counterinsurgency effort.13 
The population’s monopoly on the provision of legitimacy serves as a significant 
rationale for pursuing a population- centric strategy.  
A government that is considered illegitimate will rarely, if ever, gain the public 
support necessary to end an insurgency, and adding U.S. support to an illegitimate regime 
may generate resentment among otherwise neutral population groups. If the government 
achieved legitimacy in a culturally acceptable fashion, but is struggling to provide value 
                                                 
10 M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the 
Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan 
(Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 140. 
11 Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq, 141. 
12 Rothstein, Arquilla, “Understanding the Afghan Challenge,” 8–9. 
13 Nagl, et al., U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Manual; Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in 
Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May–June 2005): 9. 
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and services to its population, external assistance and education may improve popular 
perception. As noted in the RAND study How Insurgencies End, by Connable and 
Libicki, “favorable endings are produced from well-timed, aggressive, fully resourced, 
population-centric campaigns that address the root cause of the insurgency.”14 
2. National Identity 
Chris Mason asserts that nation-building is impossible for external supporters of 
host governments. Mason’s definition of nation building deviates slightly from common 
usage by characterizing it as the process of developing a deep-seated sense of 
nationalism, referred to as “national identity,” among the preponderance of the 
population.15 Mason cites a lack of national interest to explain low motivation in Afghan 
security forces (ASF) necessary to counter the Taliban (TB) and asserts that while 
national identity is required for counterinsurgency success, it is insufficient. Mason’s 
emphasis on national identity and its effect on governmental resolve ties directly with the 
RAND study, Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, by Christopher Paul, 
which claims that all successful counterinsurgent governments demonstrate a high level 
of commitment and motivation, both by implementing reforms and pursuing insurgents.16 
Mason’s point reinforces that government and security forces must share strong 
commitment to prevail over a committed insurgent.  
Mason quotes the Tanzanian scholar Godfrey Mwakikagile: 
Tribalism is incompatible with nationalism, and nation building is 
impossible without nationhood. And you can’t have nationhood without a 
genuine feeling of common citizenship and identity.17 
Ultimately, asserts Mason, a country that lacks a national identity will fail to 
establish a government accepted as legitimate by the majority of the population, and 
                                                 
14 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 
2013), 153. 
15 Mason, “Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq,” 147–155. 
16 Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunnigan, Paths to Victory: Lessons from 
Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2013), 182. 
17 Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq,148. 
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security forces will not risk their lives for an abstract cause that transcends tribal or local 
priorities. Mason uses South Vietnam and Iraq as examples of governments that failed 
due to lack of national identity and predicts that Afghanistan will suffer the same fate. 
3. Capacity and Willingness to Deny Sanctuary and Associated Support  
For this research, sanctuary includes the physical terrain, materials, social 
empathy, and direct support provided by a population in close proximity to an insurgent 
group. Sanctuary may be found within state boundaries or externally. Physical sanctuary 
exists where the location and geography provide either significant distance from security 
forces or restricted access. Social support within insurgent sanctuaries may be of three 
kinds: individuals may be supportive toward the group’s aims; coerced sufficiently to 
permit insurgent functioning in the area; or largely neutral, which translates to passive 
support. The rural or urban nature of the environment shapes the degree to which each 
type of sanctuary is most significant.  
In How Insurgencies End, Connable and Libicki analyze conditions that support 
an insurgency or bring about its conclusion, including the impact of duration and external 
factors such as sanctuary, outside intervention, and support for the government or 
insurgents. In the cases studied by Connable and Libicki, insurgents who lacked 
sanctuary were successful roughly 14% of the time, while insurgents with sanctuary were 
successful nearly 50% of the time.18  
In his 2005 article, “Why the Strong Lose,” Jeffrey Record reflects on the ideas of 
Arreguín-Toft, Andrew Mack, and Gill Merom to establish a baseline argument for why 
stronger forces lose in irregular conflicts. Arreguín-Toft argues that stronger powers 
should match the strategy of the guerrilla. Mack suggests that guerrillas are more 
committed, because the stakes are high for them personally. Merom posits that greater 
powers like the United States fail because of “sensitivities to casualties,” “repugnance to 
brutality,” and “commitment to democratic life.”19 In addition to concepts such as 
strategic interactions, superior will, and willingness to sacrifice, Record includes external 
                                                 
18 Connable, Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 35. 
19 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Parameters 35, no.4 (Winter 2005–2006): 21. 
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support as a necessary but insufficient condition for insurgent victory.20 Record affirms 
the insights of Arreguín-Toft, Mack, and Merom while adding that external insurgent 
support has the potential to alter the dynamics of a power relationship between two 
actors. For example, an insurgent who is initially weaker than the government may 
become stronger as a result of external support.21  
Paul’s study is an extensive review of historical counterinsurgencies that 
considers three variables critical in counterinsurgency success: “tangible support 
reduction”; “commitment and motivation”; and “flexibility and adaptability.”22 Although 
these variables are strategy-based, the first two may also be considered preconditions—is 
the host government able or willing to contest insurgency-owned spaces? Tangible 
support reduction as described by Paul includes disruption of sanctuary, material support, 
recruitment, funding, and intelligence, and directly pertains to the benefits of physical 
and social sanctuary. Commitment and motivation to fight an insurgency, the second 
variable, also serves as a precondition. Critics generally understand commitment and 
motivation as referring both to the affected government and its security forces. In 
evaluating this precondition, the United States must determine whether the affected 
government shares the same commitment to combatting the insurgency as the United 
States. The United States cannot desire victory more than the government in question. 
Paul’s recommendations for success from observations in his study include 
forcing insurgents to fight as guerrillas by maintaining a force advantage, focusing 
strategies on denying insurgent support to a greater degree than winning popular support, 
maintaining flexibility, a willingness to conduct multiple lines of operations, and 
refraining from overly harsh tactics. Further, in developing host-nation security forces, it 
is better to produce fewer quality soldiers than more poorly trained soldiers. Paul sees 
securing the commitment of partner governments and elites as useful and suggests it be 
done through reform measures and equitable incentives.23 According to Paul’s research, 
                                                 
20 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Parameters 35, no.4 (Winter 2005–2006): 22. 
21 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Parameters 35, no.4 (Winter 2005–2006): 22. 
22 Paul, et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons Insurgencies, 181–182. 
23 Paul, et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons Insurgencies, xxxiv–xxxv. 
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minimizing insurgent support is closely correlated with counterinsurgent success, and 
denying sanctuary and material support in some cases is more important than gaining 
popular support.24  
4. Political and Social Will 
Another variable that strongly shapes outcomes for an affected government is the 
political and social will of external supporters. For the United States, political and social 
will is described as the willingness of the people and their elected representatives to 
advocate continued support for an overseas counterinsurgency effort. The nature of 
conflict, recent history, and scope of the conflict shapes its popularity. In addition to 
societal approval, congressional willingness to fund a potentially long campaign is also 
required. Studies suggest that once support is given, premature withdrawal of support has 
a detrimental effect.25  
In his 1975 article “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” Andrew Mack 
concludes that political and social will, or “internal dissent,” is often responsible for the 
withdrawal of stronger powers from asymmetric conflicts. Mack concludes, “They have 
failed to realize that in every asymmetric conflict where the external power has been 
forced to withdraw, it has been as a consequence of internal dissent.”26 Particularly in the 
United States, it is important to consider the political and social will of the people before 
committing forces to a counterinsurgency.  
Arreguín-Toft emphasizes the importance of political and social will in “How the 
Weak Win Wars,” highlighting two central elements to consider in countering 
asymmetric threats. The first is to prepare American citizens for a long employment of 
forces and the second is to send troops who are trained to fight an insurgency.27 The 
                                                 
24 Paul, et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons Insurgencies, 182. 
25 Edward G. Anderson, “A Dynamic Model of Counterinsurgency Policy Including the Effects of 
Intelligence, Public Security, Popular Support, and Insurgent Experience,” System Dynamics Review 27, 
no. 2 (April/June 2011): 113. 
26 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 200. 
27 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no.1 (Summer 2001): 123. 
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implication is that if the public does not support a long conflict, the military may be 
pressured to withdraw before an acceptable outcome is achieved.  
5. Shared Political Objectives  
It is critically important to evaluate whether key goals and objectives are held in 
common between the U.S. and potential host countries. It is not necessary, however, that 
both countries agree on all aspects of the situation. Analysts may evaluate alignment by 
assessing the character and biases of potential partners.28 The character of government is 
described as its type— e.g., democratic, theocratic, or autocratic—and its compatibility 
with U.S. moral and ethical expectations. For example, supporting an abusive 
government or one that refuses to embrace reforms is unlikely to produce a favorable 
outcome. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the importance of promoting 
legitimacy. If a government is focused on killing insurgents and unwilling to address root 
causes, desired outcomes are improbable.29  
In The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach, Brian Burton identifies 
elements vital to indirect U.S. strategy. These include improving the host nation’s 
governing capacity through reliably providing essential services, supporting leadership 
focused on the rule of law and equitable justice, acting to reduce corruption in the 
security forces and local governing organizations, and incorporating reforms to address 
economic and political grievances—all of which focus on a population-centric approach 
to counterinsurgency. Such an approach recognizes that legitimacy developed through 
positive actions may reduce support for the insurgency. Burton recommends considering 
whether a host country’s behavior is conducive to countering an insurgency before 
providing security-force assistance.30 In many cases, this precondition can become a 
secondary consideration, for fear of probable outcomes without U.S. assistance; but 
Burton asserts that if a host nation does not share critical goals and objectives, 
intervention is likely to fail. A government that seeks assistance but is unwilling to 
                                                 
28 U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency 
Guide (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2009), 37–38. 
29 Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” 10. 
30 Burton, “Promise Peril the Indirect Approach,” 58. 
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address corruption or enable reforms is a big part of the problem; such governments 
seldom prevail, even with assistance.31 
David Kilcullen poses four considerations to use in deciding whether to support a 
counterinsurgency: 
1. What kind of state are we trying to build or assist? 
2. How compatible is the local government’s character with our own? 
3. What kinds of states have proven viable in the past, in this country and 
with this population? 
4. What evidence is there that the kind of state we are trying to build will be 
viable?32  
Kilcullen asserts that shared objectives are a key element in any decision to 
support a host nation and that the U.S. must establish realistic expectations as to what 
objectives are possible. Compatibility with the host government emerges as a common 
element of success in the reviewed literature. In this research, ideological compatibility is 
referred to as “shared political objectives.”  
E. THE THREE CRITICAL PRECONDITIONS 
The literature suggests many factors that are relevant to the success of 
counterinsurgency operations, many of them strategy-based and internal to the conflict. 
The manner in which counterinsurgents choose to develop and implement a strategy 
greatly affects the outcome of the conflict. This research, however, focuses on the less 
frequently considered, but equally relevant, preconditions that may determine success or 
failure. Of the five identified in this research, three are considered critical in U.S. 
decision making. 
1. Legitimacy  
An illegitimate government is likely a significant factor in motivating an 
insurgency, and legitimacy can only be derived from the population it represents.33 
                                                 
31 Burton, “Promise Peril the Indirect Approach,” 58–59. 
32 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 12. 
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Nearly every piece of COIN literature reviewed validates legitimacy as a variable, either 
explicitly or implicitly.34 While the United States may assist in improving legitimacy, it 
cannot create legitimacy where it does not exist. A host government must have adequate 
legitimacy in its foundations to succeed against an insurgency in the long term.  
2. Capacity to Deny Sanctuary and Support 
A host government’s capacity to deny sanctuary and disrupt external support is 
also crucial. Sanctuary facilitates logistical support, allows insurgents to avoid pressure, 
and enables preparations for future actions. When the insurgent’s survival is at risk, 
sanctuary provides time and space to regroup.35 Both Paul’s and Connable’s respective 
RAND studies along with Jeffrey Record cite the critical nature of sanctuary and the 
necessity of degrading tangible support for the enemy.36 Furthermore, the host 
government should demonstrate an ability to deny sanctuary before the arrival of U.S. 
support. When appropriate tactics are used, actions by indigenous forces are less likely 
than actions by occupiers to provoke a backlash from the population.37 Beyond the 
material requirements needed to deny physical sanctuary, denying social sanctuary is also 
critical, and entails practical demonstrations of regard for the population. If the host 
government is unwilling to address grievances, populations may become sympathetic to 
the insurgency and refuse to supply the intelligence needed for discriminant operations.  
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of 
Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 86 no.2 (March–April 2006); Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of 
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34 Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq,; Rothstein, Arquilla, Afghan Endgames: 
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35 Joseph D. Celeski, “Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction,” Military 
Review 86, no.6 (November–December 2006): 51–52. 
36 Paul, et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons Insurgencies,182; Record, Why the Strong Lose, 22; 
Connable, Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 34–35. 
37 U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency 
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3. Shared Political Objectives  
Unity of effort is required between a host country and an external supporter to 
counter a committed insurgent. Stability and security are unlikely to prevail if the support 
given to a host government is conditional on objectives that run counter to the host 
country’s political traditions. Reasonable shared objectives empower the host government 
to use indigenous approaches in fighting an insurgency. Although not always referred to 
as “shared political objectives,” the imperative of compatible goals among partnering 
governments is commonly referenced.38  
4. Preconditions Not Considered Essential to U.S. Success 
Of the five preconditions reviewed in this research, two are suggested to be less 
significant: political and social will and national identity. American political and social 
will is most critical in larger-scale engagements. While it is unclear whether the United 
States is capable of projecting a minimal footprint, the literature suggests that smaller-
scale responses are more likely to be supported by Americans.39 The factor of national 
identity, a significant component in Afghanistan and Iraq, reached critical importance in 
these theaters because of exacerbating factors—a legitimacy crisis, unresponsive 
governance, and strategic miscalculations. When an inappropriate strategy is 
implemented, the challenges associated with national identity increase. Therefore, when 
the United States applies an appropriate strategy the precondition of national identity 
becomes less determinate. In countries with many different identities, empowering local 
leadership and security forces has the potential to bring stability and ease discontent. 
F. HYPOTHESIS 
The literature devotes extensive attention to counterinsurgency strategies while 
overlooking significant variables that strongly predict conflict outcomes. This research 
identifies five preconditions and suggests that three are necessary (but not sufficient) to 
defeat a capable and committed insurgency: 
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1. The host government must be legitimate.  
2. The host government must have the capacity and willingness to deny 
sanctuary and associated support.  
3. The host government must demonstrate shared political objectives with 
the United States. 
G. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
The method of research will be a comparative analysis of four U.S. cases from 
1980 to the present. This analysis will focus on the relevance of the three selected 
preconditions on the outcomes of the cases. The cases are evaluated from the viewpoint 
of a prospective external supporter of a counterinsurgency.  
The cases of El Salvador and the Philippines were selected as examples of 
successful interventions.40 El Salvador faced a communist insurgency intent on 
overthrowing the existing government, while the Philippines faced Islamic extremists 
intent on establishing a separate autonomous government. In the Afghan and Iraqi cases, 
both countries had new governments and security forces that required significant support; 
neither is deemed a success. The transitions from interstate conflict to insurgency in these 
cases provide excellent test cases for the preconditions identified. Despite not being 
precursors to U.S. support in Iraq and Afghanistan, the variables are important when the 
United States considers staying and countering the insurgency. Comparing these four 
cases reveals the correlation of preconditions and outcomes. 
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II. CASE 1: THE PHILIPPINES 
From 2002–2014, during Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P), the 
United States supported the Philippine government’s efforts to suppress the Islamic based 
Moro insurgency. The Philippine case study is designed to provide context to the factors 
that led to the insurgency. The pre-existing conditions of legitimacy, denial of sanctuary 
and shared political objectives are evaluated in relation to their impact on the outcome of 
the case.  
The history of the Muslim populations in the Philippines is one of repression 
through colonization and a lack of political representation. Missionaries first introduced 
Islam to the Philippines in the late thirteenth century. At that time, the Muslim 
populations shared a degree of social and political unity unlike that of other groups in the 
Philippines. As a result, many owned property and items of value. However, in the 
sixteenth century, the Spanish colonized the islands and set out to eradicate Islam by 
forcibly converting Muslims to Christianity. The Spanish rule and repressive actions 
lasted until the conclusion of the Spanish American War. With the United States as the 
new colonial power, transfer of land ownership to Catholic elites and political changes 
followed. The loss of land ownership during both Spanish and American colonization 
signified the loss of Muslims’ right to self-governance.41  
The 1940s served as a period of both hardship and hope for the Philippines. In late 
1941, the Japanese seized control of the territory, a reality that remained until 1945 when 
Douglas MacArthur liberated the Philippines. As a holdover from the Japanese 
occupation, communist resistance groups exist in the Philippines today. Of those groups, 
the New People’s Army (NPA) continues to pose a threat to the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP).42  
Despite the Philippines gaining independence in 1946, the Moro populations’ 
poor quality of life remained largely unchanged. A history of repression, lack of 
                                                 
41 Adam Hudson, “U.S. Wages “War on Terror” in the Philippines,” Truth-out.org. accessed 
December 9, 2015, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/30061-us-wages-war-on-terror-in-the-philippines. 
42 Watts et al., Countering Others Insurgencies, 66–67. 
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representation, and extreme poverty led these populations to revolt. As a result, the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Al Qaeda-affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were formed to affect change. The ASG, 
the MILF and the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) resorted to acts of terror, 
which included kidnapping and ransoming students and tourists to fund operations. “U.S. 
interests were piqued shortly before 9/11 when the ASG kidnapped several U.S. citizens 
and held them hostage on Basilan.”43 In late 2000, Philippine President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo requested U.S. assistance to counter the growing Islamic 
insurgency.44 
1. Philippine Government Legitimacy 
To evaluate GRP legitimacy it is necessary to understand what factors contribute 
to legitimacy in Philippine culture. The GRP’s transition from an autocracy to democracy 
in 1986 serves as not only a significant movement toward legitimacy, but also sets a 
precedent for future self-determination. In this context, actions taken by the government 
to further improve representation would be perceived as legitimizing actions. 
Additionally, security forces that further subordinated themselves to civilian control and 
that reduced collateral damage and human rights violations would increase the perception 
of legitimacy. Beyond reforms to the security forces, the reduction of nepotism and 
corruption in politics would raise the population’s view of the government. Infrastructure 
development in the poorer underdeveloped regions would also improve legitimacy. 
Because the Philippines have historically experienced significant government corruption 
the population would tolerate minimal levels of corruption as normal while still viewing 
the GRP as legitimate.45  
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Prior to U.S. involvement in 2002, the GRP had transitioned from an autocratic 
institution with significant corruption, criminality and nepotism to a functioning 
democracy still in need of political and military reforms. In dealing with the Islamic 
insurgency, it was common practice for the AFP to sweep through an area engaging both 
civilians and insurgents alike. Heavy damage to property and high civilian casualties 
contributed significantly to the populations disdain for the AFP and the GRP as a 
whole.46 Historically, the Philippine, president’s demeanor shaped the strategy to deal 
with dissidents and unrest. For instance, President Marcos (1965-1986) relied more 
heavily on military force, which included martial law, than socio-economic measures 
directed at the root cause of the unrest. Maria Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) enacted 
numerous reforms in the newly established democracy as a combined approach to address 
the discontent.47 At different times during the 1980s and 1990s, agreements were reached 
with the MNLF for increased autonomy and what equated to concessions for Muslim 
populations. In 1989, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was created for 
districts in Mindanao. In 1991, the historically centralized GRP passed legislation that 
decentralized the government’s control to the local level. This legislation provided 
latitude and autonomy for locals to select leadership who represented their interests.48 By 
the mid-1990s, agreements between the GRP and the MNLF made provisions for former 
fighters to establish government provided farms and to integrate into the AFP.49  
Despite these different initiatives intended to pacify the Islamic dissidents, the 
more radical elements of the MILF and the ASG continued to rely on violence to pursue 
an Islamic State in the southern Philippines. For those elements, anything less than the 
establishment of an Islamic State was insufficient. As a result, the sophistication and 
fervor of their efforts increased following the end of the Soviet occupation of 
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Afghanistan in 1989. Islamic fighters who had supported the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan 
were returning to their homes in Indonesia and the Philippines.50  
Although imperfect, the GRP has trended more toward an increased level of 
legitimacy. As part of this trend, the power brokers within the military ceded greater 
control and oversight to civilian leaders within the government. Through reforms, the 
GRP progressively moved toward inclusion of minority groups and the employment of 
military tactics that emphasize care for civilians through better target discrimination. It is 
likely that Muslim populations will continue to feel a degree of political isolation; only 
5% of the population is Muslim in an almost entirely Catholic country (83%).51 Despite 
moderate levels of corruption, the majority of the Philippine’s citizens remain committed 
to democracy and affords a degree of legitimacy to their government.52 
2. Capacity to Deny Sanctuary and Support 
A host country’s capacity and commitment to denying insurgent sanctuary is a 
strong predictor of success in counterinsurgency operations. Denying sanctuary, like 
legitimacy, should be measured in relative terms. It is not realistic to think the 
counterinsurgent will be able to deny all sanctuary; if that were the case, the insurgency 
would not likely have the time and space to materialize. Rather, denying sanctuary refers 
to denying much of the sanctuary available to the insurgents and the social and material 
support inherent in that sanctuary.53  
Sanctuary used by the ASG and the MILF is a function of rugged topography and 
Muslim demographic concentrations in the southern Philippines. The “Philippines consist 
of over 7100 islands surrounded by the Philippine Sea to the east and the South China 
Sea to the west.”54 On the southern islands, which have the greatest concentrations of 
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Muslim citizens, the terrain is extremely rugged inland, with the majority of people living 
along the coastal areas near the cities.55 Although there are Muslims in Manila and 
southern Mindanao, the MILF and the ASG have historically relied on the islands south 
of Mindanao along the Sulu Archipelago for sanctuary. These areas are difficult for GRP 
security forces to reach undetected. Additionally, the population within these sanctuaries 
has traditionally sympathized with the insurgent cause—an environment that made 
intelligence collection difficult for GRP security forces.  
Abu Sayyaf Group and MILF sanctuaries were largely internal to the Philippines, 
allowing these groups to leverage these areas for much-needed financial and material 
support from AQ and JI. During the 1980s, the future ASG leader Abdurajak Janjalani 
developed relationships with both AQ and JI while fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
Along with Janjalani, Philippine based fighters sharpened their knowledge of tactics and 
guerrilla fighting skills. In addition to skills, the relationships that developed fighting 
alongside AQ and JI members earned them future financial and material support in 
fighting their own insurgency.56 
Following the rise in violence in the early 1990s, the GRP escalated its 
counterinsurgency efforts against the ASG. At this time, the AFP retained the character 
of the military under the autocratic Marcos regime.57 As a result, the methods used to 
counter terrorist activities were harsh. Many of the AFP’s early efforts were directed at 
leadership targeting. Raids often relied on poor intelligence, used indiscriminate fires, 
and were compromised. Despite these challenges, the AFP did find success in degrading 
the Islamic insurgency. In 1998, the AFP killed ASG leader Abdurajak Janjalani. His 
death disrupted the ASG’s organizational structure and support gained from his personal 
relationships with both AQ and JI. Moreover, following the world trade center bombings 
in 1993, travel restrictions were placed on key AQ financiers by the GRP that effectively 
cut AQ support to the ASG. The killing of Abdurajak Janjalani and subsequent reduction 
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in support severely disrupted the ASG. The leadership vacuum split the ASG into 
factions, one based in Basilan and the other in Sulu. Without critical support, the ASG 
resorted to kidnapping for ransom to fund operations.58 
Prior to U.S. support in 2002, the GRP demonstrated the basic capacity and 
willingness to disrupt insurgent sanctuary and the support associated with it. However, 
AFP intelligence collecting was limited. As a result, many operations relied on wide 
sweeping offensives that were abusive toward the population. The GRP did conduct 
counter terrorism operations into many of the deepest Moro sanctuaries; however, most 
operations were short-term events that failed to improve the security environment where 
they were conducted. Moreover, during that period, AFP operations ultimately did more 
to foster ASG/MILF support as a result of their indiscriminate tactics.59 
3. Philippine Political Objectives 
The GRP’s objectives revolved primarily around the development of internal 
security and stability. The GRP sought to improve the AFP’s capacity to conduct both 
counter terror and counterinsurgency operations. U.S. trainers were seen as the means to 
reach that end.60 Further, Philippine leaders understood that U.S. support brought access 
to funding and technology, as well as the opportunity for increased legitimacy through 
security force improvements and messaging campaigns. One of the GRP’s greater goals 
was to leverage U.S. support against all internal threats. In response to numerous internal 
attacks, the GRP sought to degrade both the communist NPA and the Islamic ASG. Of 
the two organizations, the NPA represented the greater threat to the GRP’s sovereignty 
and stability.61 Naturally, the NPA represented a more pressing problem to the GRP than 
the ASG. Although capable of significant attacks, the ASG remained isolated to the 
southern Philippines. As an additional objective, the GRP sought to develop agreements 
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with more moderate Muslim organizations through reforms, as opposed to targeted 
military actions. 
Although the United States and the Philippines shared numerous objectives, they 
also experienced some friction in areas where their goals were not shared. Initially, one of 
the more significant differences arose when it became clear that Philippine law required 
governmental approval to allow U.S. forces to conduct unilateral operations. When the 
Philippine government did not approve, the United States had to employ an indirect 
approach. Additionally, U.S. support was specifically directed at dismantling the Islamic 
threats and not the communist NPA.62 Although it was recognized that improving the 
AFP’s capacity enhanced their ability to counter the NPA was key, direct intelligence and 
technical support to those operations was withheld. This distinction between which types 
of operations would be supported served as a point of contention between the two 
countries.63 In regards to the MILF, the GRP was intent on conducting negotiations and 
reforms as a way to pacify any threat posed by the organization. Conversely, the United 
States was intent on labeling the MILF as a terrorist organization because of its ties to the 
ASG. Despite the MILF’s provision of sanctuary and support to ASG and JI, the GRP 
refused to directly target the MILF to prevent any escalation in violence or disruption of 
ongoing resolutions.64  
4. Shared Political Objectives 
At the request of the Philippine president, the United States government agreed to 
support the GRP in countering its Islamic insurgency. The decision was followed closely 
by AQs’ attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. In the wake of the attack, 
intelligence made it clear that several key figures within AQ had received operational 
support in the Philippines. Moreover, sanctuaries in the southern Philippines had been 
used to raise funds and serve as a staging area for operations. For the United States, the 
Philippines represented the front line for combating Islamic terrorism in Southeast 
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Asia.65 Following the decision to support the GRP, both governments signed a bilateral 
security assistance agreement outlining the terms and conditions of the support. 
The United States’ objectives in the Philippines were focused on countering the 
Islamic extremist threat to prevent future attacks against the United States. To achieve 
this objective, three lines of operation (LOO) were devised: “building partner force 
capacity, improving civil military relations, and informing the populous to highlight the 
development projects and professionalism demonstrated by the AFP and the GRP.”66 
Despite U.S. forces being restricted to advising and assisting the AFP, they still 
accomplished their objective of severely degrading Islamic terrorism in the Philippines.67  
Beginning in 2002, U.S. support focused on enhancing the CT and COIN capacity 
of the AFP. This step was designed to not only improve relations with disaffected 
populations through a reduction in collateral damage, but also to increase the intelligence 
collection in the Moro communities. Prior to U.S. involvement, the AFP’s focus was 
sanctuary disruption through brute force; after U.S. involvement, it shifted to sanctuary 
denial through specific military action, which involved co-opting social sanctuary 
through development and reform measures directed at the root of the discontent. As a 
result of increased counterinsurgency pressure in areas of traditional ASG sanctuary, the 
AFP, with U.S. support, killed Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sulaiman. The ASG’s 
subsequent inability to maintain its ties to both the MILF and JI severely degraded its 
organizational structure and offensive capability.68 
During OEF-P, the United States and the GRP shared numerous objectives. Both 
parties believed that the development of the Philippine military and civilian capacity was 
a critical component to dismantling Islamic dissident organizations. Additionally, both 
understood that reforms designed to enhance the legitimacy of the security forces and the 
government were key to the COIN strategy. Legitimacy was reinforced by greater target 
                                                 
65 Watts et al., Countering Others Insurgencies, 102–103.  
66 Burton, “Promise and Peril the Indirect Approach,” 51; Wilson “Anatomy Successful COIN 
Operation OEF,” 6. 
67 Watts et al., Countering Others Insurgencies, 63. 
68 Fellman, Abu Sayyaf Group, 6. 
 23
discrimination in CT efforts and reductions in collateral damage from AFP operations. 
Following security improvements, targeted development projects enhanced intelligence 
collection and served to deny sanctuary to the enemy. These developments demonstrated 
a shared population centric approach to countering the Islamic insurgency.  
When analyzing the Philippine case in respect to shared objectives, it is important 
to recognize that the level of similarity be viewed in relative terms and that the objectives 
that were shared were critical ones. In this case, the U.S. government and the GRP shared 
the objectives of improving the capacity of the AFP to conduct population centric 
counterinsurgency and counter terrorist operations, incorporating civilian organizations 
for development projects and enabling reforms within the government and military to 
reduce corruption and build increased legitimacy. Although not completely destroyed, 
ASG numbers are now at a manageable level. Analysts suggest that the ASG is more 
focused on survival at this point; with limited external support from JI, its ability to 
export violence against the United States is limited.69 Although there were differing 
objectives in some areas, the United States shared enough objectives with the GRP to 
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III. CASE 2: EL SALVADOR  
When the five factions of the communist insurgency in El Salvador unified 
against the government under the name Farabundi Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) in 1980, the United States was unwilling to allow another Central American 
country to fall to communism. The El Salvador case provides context to the insurgency 
and the United States’ role in these events. The pre-existing conditions of legitimacy, 
denial of sanctuary, and shared political objectives are evaluated in relation to their 
impact on the case.70  
Salvadorians’ discontent traces its roots back to Spanish Colonization 1839, a 
period in Salvadorian history responsible for creating the great divide between the rich 
land owning elites and the poor. Furthermore, the military, predominantly controlled by 
the elites, brutally suppressed attempts at reform and efforts toward achieving political 
representation for the working class. The 1932 peasant uprising, la Matanza, serves as an 
example of that reality, with a death toll close to 40,000 people.71 
Despite some progress in the growth of a middle class, the discontent of the 
average citizen continued into the 1960s and 1970s. The limited growth experienced at 
that time was the result of urban development, which created opportunities beyond the 
traditional agricultural sphere. Growth in the industrial sector and access to education and 
technology spurred the working class to organize and achieve political representation. 
The Christian Democrat Party (PDC), founded in 1960, served as the initial platform to 
seek this government representation. In the 1977 election, the incumbent government 
fraudulently placed its candidate into office. The failure of the democratic process to 
bring about political change drove many toward violence and the pursuit of Marxist 
ideals. Marxists often seek freedom from military dictatorship, adhere to a liberation 
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theology, express dissatisfaction with the land-owning elites, and pursue opportunities for 
the middle class.72 
Following the Sandinista revolution in neighboring Nicaragua (1979), dissidents 
in El Salvador began turning toward violence as the primary vehicle for change. 
Recognizing conditions rife for revolution, Cuban President Fidel Castro unified and 
supported the newly formed FMLN. Despite increased attacks and an all-out offensive in 
early 1981, the Armed Forces El Salvador (ESAF) was able to prevent the overthrow of 
the government. However, the large-scale offensive by the FMLN demonstrated to the 
United States that both economic and military aid was necessary to prevent another 
Central American country from falling to communism.73 
1. Salvadorian Government Legitimacy 
To evaluate Salvadorian legitimacy, it is necessary to understand how and from 
whom legitimacy is derived in that culture. In all cases, a government’s level of 
legitimacy is directly tied to its population. A government gains popular support by 
providing the population with its basic needs. Beyond the provision of basic needs, 
culture determines if an autocratic or democratic government is acceptable and derives its 
authority legitimately. Within this accepted governance structure, the implementation of 
laws and justice also contribute significantly to establishing a government’s authority. 
Historically, El Salvador was familiar with governance that represented the concerns of 
the land-owning elites. The poorer majority felt slighted by their government; however, 
they had no recourse except violence to affect change. In this context, a government 
willing to conduct reforms in the areas of land ownership, political representation, and 
military accountability would be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of Salvadorian 
citizens. In their culture, Max Weber’s legal rational definition of legitimacy would be 
the most appropriate.  
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Prior to the United States entering El Salvador in the early 1980s, the Salvadorian 
government served as a symbol of injustice to the revolutionaries. Up until the 1970s, the 
social structure in El Salvador was characterized as a feudal system in which a small 
number of elites owned the land and ran the military and government, while the peasant 
class provided the labor without representation or influence in their government. In 
response to social dissidents, the ESAF conducted large-scale indiscriminant operations 
in revolutionary controlled zones of the country. These actions further fueled the crisis, 
improved the recruiting efforts of the revolutionaries and created external support for the 
revolutionaries’ cause. The extreme poverty, lack of political representation, and large-
scale military repression placed the government of El Salvador in a crisis of legitimacy.74  
In dealing with the crisis prior to U.S. support, the Salvadorian government 
primarily used a military approach to counter the insurgency. The ruling elites employed 
the ESAF to brutally block attempts at reforms that threatened their power and control of 
both the government and the military. In 1979 and 1980, the harsh tactics employed by 
the ESAF forced the revolutionaries underground; this repression further drove them 
toward violence as a means to affect change. 
However, despite creating greater dissent in 1979–1980, the Salvadorian 
government did make small reforms targeted at the core grievances espoused by the 
revolutionaries. The government of El Salvador conducted basic land reforms such as 
expropriating larger farms and transitioning them into cooperatives; although, more were 
required to have a meaningful impact.75 Beyond land reforms, the rise of political parties 
signaled a greater willingness to support human rights and the concept of democracy. 
Additionally, the promotion of young reformist military officers was encouraged to 
provide balance against a historically brutal officer corp. Unfortunately, most of these 
reforms failed to produce organizational change at that time. Despite the disappointing 
attempt at reform, the first junta started the conversation that eventually led to a 
legitimate and democratically elected government.  
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Salvadorian legitimacy can be qualified through consideration of the 
government’s reform efforts and the ESAF’s approach to the insurgency. Measuring 
legitimacy in relative terms assists in characterizing a government that falls between 
legitimate and illegitimate. In El Salvador, the ruling classes’ disregard for social 
mobility and the military’s lack of regard for human rights and accountability suggest 
that the government of El Salvador existed to the left of center on the legitimacy scale. 
As such, some government actions contributed to the rise of the FMLN. Despite these 
contributions, the government still retained enough legitimacy to prevent the FMLN from 
garnering widespread popular support. Furthermore, the character of the military 
remained largely unchanged until the United States became involved in the conflict in 
early 1981.  
2. Capacity to Deny Sanctuary and Support 
A host country’s ability and willingness to deny insurgent sanctuary and the 
support associated with that sanctuary is considered a strong predictor of success in an 
intrastate conflict.76 Denying sanctuary means denying the majority of sanctuary 
available to the insurgents and actively targeting the support they receive as a function of 
that sanctuary. When determining a host government’s capacity to deny sanctuary prior 
to U.S. support, it is important to consider if government forces contest insurgent 
controlled areas. Further, in cases where external support and sanctuary do exist, it is 
important to determine whether the government engages other governments where the 
external sanctuary and support originates.77  
The revolutionary groups that arose in the 1970s enjoyed a degree of internal 
sanctuary in most of the 14 provinces of El Salvador. They formed what were referred to 
as “zones of popular control” in the rural areas.78 Following the stitching together of 
rebel groups into the FMLN in 1979, preparations were made to organize and establish an 
extensive international support network. The FMLN divided the country into five 
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separate war fronts and established guerrilla command structures complete with specific 
responsibilities that supported the revolution as a whole. Each of these fronts was divided 
into three zones: the rear guard area, defensive zone, and expansion zone. The rearguard 
zone was designated to house the command and control elements, as well as key logistic 
infrastructure. The rearguard served as the most secure and least likely to be surprised by 
the ESAF. The second zone was the defensive zone, an area in which most of the fighting 
occurred between the ESAF and the guerrillas.79 Many of the guerrilla forces used these 
areas temporarily to avoid ESAF offensives. In numerous cases, the ESAF displaced the 
population from the defensive zone because it employed indiscriminant operations in 
these areas. Ultimately, the defensive zone served as a buffer for ESAF attempts to strike 
into the rearguard areas. The third zone, the expansion zone, is where the guerrillas 
attempted to mobilize additional support and recruits to join their revolution. Beyond the 
five fronts within El Salvador, external sanctuary and support was also readily available 
to the insurgents. Several FMLN senior leaders established headquarters and operated out 
of Nicaragua. Additionally, Honduras served as another area of refuge and a source of 
logistic support to the guerrillas.80 Although more separated geographically, Cuba 
channeled extensive support through neighboring countries. Ultimately, Soviet weapons 
enabled the Cuban and Nicaraguan’s support to the FMLN. As a result, from 1979–1981, 
the FMLN guerrillas were better supplied than the ESAF.81  
The ESAF’s ability to deny sanctuary and associated support prior to U.S. 
intervention in 1981 should be measured in relative terms. In response to the rising 
discontent of the country’s rural peasants, the ESAF employed harsh measures against 
the population to maintain control. These measures included death squads, which killed 
both political adversaries and sympathizers of the revolution. In 1980–81, death squads 
displaced revolutionary leadership through their highly effective intimidation efforts. As 
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a result, the revolution’s “diplomatic core” operated outside of the country.82 Although 
effective at denying internal sanctuary to some elements, the ESAF was not effective at 
denying external sanctuary in the early years. Additionally, the FMLN’s multi-faceted 
support structure made denial of sanctuary nearly impossible. When the ESAF was 
effective at disrupting support along one avenue, the level of support from another was 
increased. Prior to receiving its own external support, the Salvadorian government had 
limited means to address the external sanctuary and support provided to the FMLN. 
Furthermore, because El Salvador shared borders with three countries that either directly 
provided or allowed support to pass through their countries to the revolutionaries, sealing 
the borders was beyond the capacity of the ESAF in the early years of both the civil war 
and the insurgency phases of the conflict.83 
Moreover, in the late 1970s, the ESAF’s size and level of training were 
inadequate to defeat the revolutionaries in El Salvador. During this time, the ESAF had 
roughly 11,000 soldiers, and most lacked training in counterinsurgency operations. 
Despite these deficiencies, the ESAF did conduct operations to destroy revolutionary 
support and safe havens. The desire to destroy the revolution was real; however, the 
ESAF’s disregard for human rights did more to fuel the conflict than to stop it. It became 
clear by 1980 that neither the FMLN nor the ESAF could decisively maintain an 
advantage over the other, which led the rest of the world to categorize the conflict as a 
civil war.  
The Salvadorian government recognized the need to deny FMLN sanctuary; 
however, its limitations in military capacity and knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare 
limited its effectiveness. Failing to understand how best to deny sanctuary, the ESAF 
chose an attrition strategy that undermined any attempts at reforms. Further, the ESAF 
was limited in its ability to operate in the FMLN rear areas due to long operational lines 
of communication and a lack of airmobile assets. Prior to U.S. support, the Salvadorian 
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government had the ability to disrupt insurgent sanctuary internally, but was largely 
unable to disrupt external sanctuary and support. 
3. Salvadorian Objectives 
Due to numerous transitions within the government and the realistic assumption 
that U.S. support was forthcoming, Salvadorian objectives evolved throughout the course 
of the conflict. Early objectives revolved around the destruction of the FMLN, retention 
of control and development of security force capacity. Later objectives focused more on 
reforms, civic-action, economic development and the sustainment of U.S. support to the 
military and development programs. 
After watching the Sandinistas overthrow of the Somoza government in 
neighboring Nicaragua in 1979, the Salvadorian government recognized that changes in 
the country were necessary.84 In spite of this recognition, numerous political factions 
contested the changes. In 1979, a bloodless coup led by young military officers replaced 
the existing government. Objectives of the newly formed junta included implementing a 
civil-military government to replace the exclusively military-run government. 
Additionally, the junta pushed land and economic reforms to address the growing 
dissatisfaction of the middle and working class. However, the entrenched military 
establishment and sponsoring oligarchs prevented the implementation of these reforms.85 
Subsequent governments offered fewer reforms, specifically regarding human rights 
prosecutions within the military the economy and land redistribution.  
Following the transition to a democratic government in 1984, Salvadorian 
objectives remained closely tied to the retention of power and control. Although changes 
occurred during Duarte’s presidency, many were largely ineffective at achieving their 
desired purpose, mostly because they were either poorly conceived or poorly 
implemented. The true objectives of the Salvadorian government appeared to be on 
economic development benefiting the few and military defeat of the rebels. The ESAF 
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had grown to 40,000 soldiers by that time and was demonstrating increasing success 
against the FMLN.86 Essentially, the aim was to give up the fewest concessions necessary 
to prevent the population from supporting the FMLN. The interests of entrenched leaders 
in the ESAF, land-owning elites, and politicians drove these objectives. As a whole, these 
stakeholders were determined to militarily defeat the insurgency and retain control rather 
than to address the root causes of the conflict.  
4. Shared Political Objectives 
The United States’ early policy goals in El Salvador were not clearly articulated.87 
Later documents that clarified U.S. objectives included the Woerner Report (1981), the 
National Campaign Plan (NCP)(1983), and the Kissinger Commission (1984). The 
Woerner Report essentially focused on the development of the ESAF while the NCP 
served as an overall strategy. Finally, the Kissinger Commission made the argument to 
the American people that it was important to continue to support the Salvadorian 
government.88 Prior to these documents, the 1981 Annual Integrated Assessment of 
Security Assistance for the United States Objectives in El Salvador listed the following 
informal goals: “prevention of the takeover of a friendly neighbor by communist 
guerrillas, sustainment of a democratic Salvadorian government, and prevention of 
further deterioration of the Salvadorian economy.”89 However, no formal strategy moved 
the Salvadorian government toward achieving these goals. 
Despite a lack of clear policy objectives, the U.S. and Salvadorian governments 
were able to find common ground. The intersection of U.S. and Salvadorian interests 
were most evident in the destruction of the FMLN. Furthermore, both countries 
understood that economic development was necessary in reinforcing legitimacy and 
preventing future unrest. By 1984, the United States and El Salvador had broadened their 
objectives to include developing popular support through reforms to the military and the 
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judiciary, bolstering village level civil defense, employing psychological operations, 
providing civic-action in contested areas and integrating a nationwide counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
The challenge in articulating the shared objectives between El Salvador and the 
United States is that there were numerous stakeholders on both sides influencing these 
objectives throughout the conflict. For example, one of the United States’ primary 
objectives was to sustain a democratic El Salvador; to achieve this, the ESAF had to 
subordinate themselves to civilian leadership. The military establishment and oligarch 
supporters understood this to mean a weakening of their position and influence. Beyond 
the ESAF, President Duarte’s political support from his party, the PDC, began to wane in 
the mid-to late 1980s as campaign reforms failed to materialize. Furthermore, the 
conditions placed on the Salvadorian government for continued U.S. support placed 
President Duarte at odds with his grassroots support. In spite of political challenges, El 
Salvador experienced a political party turnover from the PDC to the Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista (ARENA) in 1989, a testament to its electoral process.  
A final shift of shared objectives between the United States and the Salvadorian 
government occurred following the FMLN’s final offensive in 1989. Despite predictions 
to the contrary, the FMLN mounted a large-scale offensive against the capital. 
Ultimately, ESAF were able to repel the attack and the FMLN’s assumed popular support 
failed to materialize. The offensive clarified that neither the ESAF nor the FMLN were 
capable of defeating each other.90 Both the United States and the government of El 
Salvador made it their objective to reach a settlement. After years of mediation and 
negotiations, the FMLN and the Salvadorian government reached a negotiated settlement 
in 1992.91 By the conclusion of El Salvador’s civil war, the combined efforts of the 
United States and the government of El Salvador had prevented the further spread of 
communism, solidified democratic institutions, and reintegrated dissidents back into the 
fold.92 
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IV. CASE 3: AFGHANISTAN 
On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda conducted a coordinated attack against the 
United States, killing nearly 3000 Americans. The U.S. government determined that the 
Taliban (TB) had provided al Qaeda (AQ) the sanctuary and support necessary to mount 
the attack. In response, members of the U.S. Special Forces and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) departed for Afghanistan to link-up with the anti-Taliban Northern 
Alliance. In a matter of months, U.S.-directed air strikes combined with a Northern 
Alliance ground offensive destroyed the majority of the TB’s fighting formations and 
scattered AQ members within Afghanistan while others fled to Pakistan.93 
At the conclusion of the combined offensive, the U.S. military began deploying 
large conventional units to Afghanistan. The intent was to root out and destroy the 
remaining TB and AQ to prevent future attacks against the United States. Because the TB 
had harbored Osama Bin Laden and refused U.S. requests to turn him over, the TB 
government and its fighters became U.S. targets. In late 2001–2002, TB ranks had been 
severely depleted, and as a result, the remaining fighters resorted to guerrilla tactics to 
avoid direct confrontation with the numerically superior coalition forces. Consequently, 
in 2003 the United States developed a new campaign plan; included in this plan was a 
call to shift from combat operations to stability operations. Despite this prioritization, 
operations continued to focus largely on combat and neglected the development efforts of 
the Afghani military and the interim government.94 By this time, the conflict had changed 
from an interstate conflict to an insurgency. As a result, from 2003–2009, the security 
situation deteriorated leaving the United States questioning the possibility of a desirable 
outcome.95  
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The United States’ reliance on a largely unilateral, conventional approach to the 
insurgency failed to produce a favorable situation in Afghanistan. Additionally, TB 
numbers went from an estimated 3000 in 2004 to 30,000 in 2010.96 Furthermore, Afghan 
Security Forces (ASF) had been plagued with issues; ultimately, these forces lacked the 
ability to secure the population. In 2009, the Obama administration responded to this 
unsatisfactory situation by replacing the senior military officer in Afghanistan, outlining a 
more population centric strategy for COIN, and devoting additional resources to the 
conflict.97  
The interim Afghan government was established in early 2002, followed two 
years later by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). 
Conditions in Afghanistan following the establishment of the interim government serve 
as the departure point for this case study. Like the previous two case studies, the conflict 
in Afghanistan from 2002 forward will be evaluated based on the host government’s level 
of legitimacy, capacity and resolve to deny insurgent sanctuary and associated support, 
and shared political objectives with the United States. Unlike the previous two case 
studies, the insurgency in Afghanistan immediately followed the interstate conflict 
between the United States and the TB government. Notably, the government of 
Afghanistan did not request U.S. support in fighting its insurgency, and the United States 
did not anticipate serving in a counterinsurgent role as the TB re-emerged in late 2002.  
1. Afghanistan Government Illegitimacy 
 Any legitimacy that the GIRoA enjoys is a result of the regard it has 
demonstrated for its people. However, unlike the two countries discussed in previous 
cases, Afghanistan has had historically decentralized governance; much of its power has 
been pushed out to local authorities and tribal leaders. Following Weber’s classifications, 
“Afghanistan’s culture is based on traditional legitimacy reinforced by charismatic 
(religious) legitimacy.”98 Democracy and rational legal approaches are not something 
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Afghans value.99 Instead, indicators of legitimacy include the following at the local level: 
“delivery of justice, mediation, and dispute resolution.”100 Beyond local considerations, a 
government that abides by Islamic ideals, delivers basic services, provides security, and 
resists external influences will also enjoy a greater perception of legitimacy. Although 
accepting of culturally reasonable levels of corruption, minimizing governmental 
corruption would also have a legitimizing impact.101 However, Afghan governance has 
faced a legitimacy crisis since its inception in 2002. Assessing a government’s legitimacy 
includes determining how it governs and provides for its population, and how order is 
maintained. The evaluation of governance and security forces will shape the following 
legitimacy discussion. 
The Afghan government has suffered in popular support as a result of a faulty 
foundation. Following the toppling of the TB government in late 2001, the Loya Jirga or 
grand assembly was established to oversee interim governance decisions. In early 
proceedings, the U.S. backed factional leader, Hamid Karzai, was ushered into the role of 
interim leader. Ironically, Karzai’s position was opposed by 75% of the Loya Jirga’s 
delegates, who were in favor of the exiled King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. Under an air 
of secrecy, U.S. diplomats coerced the king to withdraw from consideration as the interim 
leader and endorse Hamid Karzai, a step that was largely perceived as U.S. meddling in 
the process.102 Although not initially, the population came to view Karzai and many other 
members of both the upper and lower houses of the government as criminally corrupt. 
Several references have been made to the Karzai family’s illicit activities in Kandahar as 
evidence to these claims.103 Additionally, Karzai—backed by the U.S. government—
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extended the reach of the central government, a move designed to consolidate control 
over regional warlords and local religious leaders.104 
The second component, ASF, serves as an additional variable that either 
contributes or detracts from the GIRoA’s legitimacy. Despite numerous shortcomings, 
the Afghan National Army (ANA) in general is perceived favorably among the 
population. Factors that informed this opinion as of 2008 included the ANA’s tenacity in 
combat, ability to gather intelligence, and higher level of training as compared to that of 
the police.105 This is not to say that units are able to effectively provide security or have 
resisted the temptations of corruption; by U.S. standards, the ANA have demonstrated a 
lack of ability and discipline.106 The Afghan National Police (ANP) has further been 
cited as having excessive corruption, lacking the most basic education and training, and 
being ill equipped to counter an insurgency, and ultimately having the highest desertion 
rates among security forces.107 Police corruption has been correlated with inadequate 
initial screening and an overall lack of mentorship. According to retired Foreign Service 
officer Chris Mason, “The ANP are considered a net security negative, in the sense that 
their existence contributes more overall to insecurity than security.”108 In sum, the 
GIRoA continues to suffer from the perception of illegitimacy, despite numerous 
elections, billions of dollars in aid, and larger and improved security forces.  
2. Capacity to Deny Sanctuary 
In this case, denying sanctuary refers to denying the majority of sanctuary 
available to the insurgents and actively targeting the support insurgents receive as a result 
of that sanctuary. Functionally, there are areas the ASF will not contest inside 
Afghanistan. It is important to consider that if Afghanistan is unable to secure its borders, 
does it engage governments with shared borders where the sanctuary and support 
originates?  
                                                 
104 Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq, 144. 
105 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 74–75. 
106 Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq, 212. 
107 Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq, 26. 
108 Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned Vietnam Iraq, 33. 
 39
Internally, Afghanistan poses several challenges to denying insurgent sanctuary. 
The combination of wide-open spaces and low population density contribute to extremely 
porous shared borders with Pakistan. Much of Afghanistan lacks a developed road 
infrastructure, and passage in some places can only be accomplished on foot, by animal 
or by small motorcycle. Afghanistan contains numerous valleys surrounded by 
impassable mountains, which afford protected environments for insurgent leadership to 
regroup and train fighters. Furthermore, weather prevents access to some of the more 
mountainous areas during the winter. Taken as a whole, Afghanistan’s topography 
affords significant opportunities for insurgent sanctuary. Beyond terrain, the TB receives 
social sanctuary in many rural areas inside Afghanistan. The lack of ASF presence has 
essentially forced the people decide which entity to support to ensure survival. In many 
cases, the answer to this question favors the TB, which is recognized by 30% of the 
population as a legitimate authority in Afghanistan.109  
Externally, Afghanistan poses additional challenges to denying sanctuary. During 
the Coalition/Northern Alliance offensive in 2001, many of the scattered TB and AQ 
fighters received sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan. Additionally, the TB received 
external support from the global jihadist network, Pakistani government officials, 
criminal networks, and militias in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of 
Pakistan.110 Support remains to this day because of Afghanistan’s inability to secure its 
borders. Pakistani leaders are content to have Afghanistan remain unstable, allowing 
them to assert a level of influence over Afghan territory through their TB proxies.111  
Denying safe havens to the TB has produced mixed results in some areas, as 
sanctuary has evolved over the duration of the conflict. For example, the Paktika 
province provided safe havens in which the TB freely and openly operated during the 
early 2000s. But following large International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) 
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operations this sanctuary was disrupted.112 However, as of 2016, extensive insurgent 
sanctuary persists in the Paktika province. Direct intervention from ISAF disrupted some 
of the more difficult-to-reach internal sanctuaries available to the TB through an 
extensive drone surveillance and targeting campaign. To this day, several internal areas 
have remained largely uncontested by the ASF and ISAF. The terrain and lack of 
proximity to military infrastructure in the provinces of Nangahar, Nuristan, and Kunar 
(N2K) have made ISAF largely ineffective at denying sanctuary. Despite some successes 
with drones, neither GIRoA nor the ISAF have demonstrated the capacity and resolve to 
deny sanctuary sufficiently to defeat the TB insurgency. 
3. Shared Political Objectives 
The Afghanistan case, unlike the previous two cases, presents challenges when 
delineating between the political objectives of the GIRoA and those of the United States. 
The United States’ presence in Afghanistan, and its large role in developing both the 
interim and elected governments of Afghanistan, blurs the line of ownership. Objectives 
laid out by the United States were largely accepted by President Karzai and later turned 
into Afghan objectives.113 However, the number of shared objectives between the United 
States Government (USG) and the GIRoA fails to tell the entire story. The ideals written 
in the newly developed constitution espoused by Afghan leaders closest to the United 
States did not accurately reflect the values of those in rural Afghanistan.114 From a 
distance, the United States and the GIRoA appeared to move in the same direction 
following the elections, but given the underlying discrepancies between the two 
countries’ goals, this path has not yet led to a desirable conclusion.  
The United States’ overarching goal was to prevent future attacks against the 
United States by “…disrupting, dismantling, and defeating AQ and deny terrorists the use 
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of safe havens in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”115 U.S. leaders recognized that to 
accomplish these goals, Afghanistan’s capacity to govern and to secure its population 
would need to be bolstered substantially.116 On the heels of the ratification of the Afghan 
constitution and the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004–2005, the “Joint 
Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership,” closely mirroring 
ideals in the constitution, provided the following objectives: “dedication to the rule of 
law”; “protection of human rights”; “support for democratic governance”; “defeat of 
international terrorism”; and “Afghan security,” “sovereignty,” “independence,” and 
“territorial integrity.”117 These objectives were designed to bring stability to Afghanistan 
and permit the United States to hand its responsibilities over to a capable and sovereign 
state. 
Despite these intentions, forcing a U.S. perspective onto the people of 
Afghanistan has resulted in a “democracy” that does not accurately reflect the ideals of 
the population. Afghan citizens recognize security, sovereignty, and independence; 
however, the rule of law, human rights, and democratic governance are foreign concepts. 
Historically, a traditional legal approach to rules was in the place where the rule of law 
exists today. Traditional laws relied upon tribal leaders and religious mullahs to 
administer justice and arbitration. In other words, traditional rights served as the 
foundation for how people were treated as opposed to today’s notion of human rights.118  
Additionally, leaders in the United States and Afghanistan have prioritized these 
shared objectives differently. The GIRoA has remained focused on its sovereignty and 
independence, conditions recognized as necessary for the U.S. coalition to conclude its 
commitments. Appropriately, both governments have pursued larger, more capable 
military and police forces; nevertheless, despite the shared desire for improved security, 
the GIRoA has proved both incapable and uncommitted to controlling corruption. While 
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the shared objective of improving security through increased ASF capacity existed, 
controlling corruption was not a top priority for the GIRoA. On the coalition side, 
National Guard soldiers and international partners of the Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) Phoenix conducted the majority of the training of both the ANA and the ANP.119 
Had the United States placed a greater premium on capacity building rather than killing 
insurgents, forces task organized to train the ANA may have been different.120 
Improvements to governance and the provision of justice have been further stifled by 
corruption. In 2006, Afghanistan’s justice system was one of, if not the least, effective 
systems in the world.121 Meanwhile, Karzai remained focused on consolidating power 
and control of the central government. Karzai had perceived the country’s militias and 
warlords as a greater threat to the GIRoA than the TB.122  
When the security situation in Afghanistan reached its worst point in early 2009, 
the USG and the GIRoA shifted toward a more population-centric strategy. In response, 
the United States reprioritized its focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. Along with new 
leadership came a revised roadmap to achieving U.S. objectives. The new strategy 
followed three lines of operation (LOO): “security,” “governance,” and 
“development.”123 Improvements to security were well recognized as a necessary 
condition to facilitate future reconstruction and development efforts. Increased focus on 
developing the capacity of the ASF prompted additional U.S. and Afghan tactical level 
partnerships. Efforts were made to create accountability and to reduce corruption in the 
government. Finally, development projects were funded and executed to provide for basic 
needs and to reinforce the government’s move toward legitimacy.124  
Although Afghanistan remains a book to which the conclusion has not yet been 
written, it appears unlikely that the U.S. objectives of “disrupting, dismantling, and 
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defeating AQ and denying terrorists the use of safe havens in both Afghanistan or 
Pakistan”125 will ever be realized. Despite reductions in AQ numbers and prominence, 
the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan seems to fill a similar niche. Although 
an argument can be made that AQ lost the strength of its foothold in Afghanistan, does it 
matter? Pakistan provides readily available sanctuary and support to the TB, as do some 
parts of Afghanistan, another reality that is unlikely to change.  
Following the evaluation of the Afghan government’s level of legitimacy, 
capacity to deny sanctuary, and shared political objectives with the United States, an 
unfavorable outcome seems inevitable. The resounding conclusion from the first variable 
is that the government lacks legitimacy. The government’s illegitimate foundation, 
rampant corruption, and troubled security forces led to this conclusion. Afghan’s inability 
to deny sanctuary and support can be directly traced to harsh terrain, unsecure borders, 
and deficient security forces. Moreover, the overall prioritization of the shared objectives 
appears to have been a contributing factor to some of the yet unachieved objectives. 
Finally, at a more basic level, GIRoA’s officially shared objectives with the United 
States, did not an accurately reflect the wishes of the Afghan population.  
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V. CASE 4: IRAQ 
Before the United States overthrow of the Iraqi regime in 2003 by armed 
invasion, Saddam Hussein was an extremely destabilizing figure in the region. Hussein 
seized power in Iraq following the former president’s resignation in 1979 and reinforced 
the Ba’ath party to strengthen his dictatorship. Although Ba’athists were a minority as 
Sunni Muslims, they maintained a dominant grip on society. Amid growing concerns 
over the spread of revolutionary Shia ideology, Hussein attacked Iran in 1980. The 
subsequent eight-year Iran–Iraq war was costly in both money and lives. Following an 
indecisive conclusion, Hussein turned his attention inward toward groups that had 
assisted the Iranian cause during the war, especially the Kurdish and Shi’ite populations, 
which had suffered brutal and repressive treatment. Having depleted much of the 
country’s wealth and incurred wartime debts, Hussein sought to recoup some of the cost 
from Kuwait. Pretexts were made as to why the Kuwaitis owed the Iraqis oil revenues, 
and when the Kuwaiti government refused to pay, Hussein invaded. The United States, 
the UN, and regional partners intervened, and in a matter of five weeks in 1991, the Iraqi 
military was forcibly removed from Kuwait.126  
With an already negative perception of Iraqi intentions in the Middle East, 
President George W. Bush made it clearly articulated that the United States would not 
allow Iraq to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In his 2003 state-of-the-union address, 
Bush articulated U.S. concerns about weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ties to 
terrorist organizations in Iraq.127 Eventually, Iraq’s denial of inspector access to its 
nuclear facilities prompted President Bush’s decision to remove Hussein. By the end of 
March 2003, the Iraqi regime and its military were overthrown.  
The rapid collapse of Hussein’s government and security apparatus created a 
complex environment for the development of a new Iraqi government. After a brief lull, 
the Sunni insurgency arose to contest the U.S. occupation. The insurgency was largely 
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composed of former Ba’athist extremists and a small number of foreign fighters.128 
Under these conditions, the Iraqi interim government in combination with the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) crafted an interim constitution. The constitution’s 
provisions included transitioning to a sovereign Iraqi interim government by the end of 
June 2004. In a little more than a year after the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, the first 
democratic elections to decide membership on the Transitional National Assembly were 
held in January 2005. By mid-October, Iraqis had voted to accept the draft constitution 
and by December 2005 the Council of Representatives election under the newly approved 
constitution was completed. Despite the accomplishment of several democratic 
milestones, sectarian violence reached unprecedented levels by mid-2006.129  
Like the Afghanistan case, Iraq began as an interstate conflict and transitioned to 
an insurgency, that later evolved into a civil war. The period following the interim 
government’s creation through the end of 2006 will serve as the period to evaluate the 
Iraqi government’s level of legitimacy, capacity to deny sanctuary, and shared political 
objectives with the United States.  
1. Iraqi Government Legitimacy 
Iraqi rule in modern history has been characterized by numerous violent 
transitions. Upon gaining independence from Great Britain in 1932, the Iraqi government 
shared similarities with British style monarchy. In October 1932, Iraq was admitted into 
the League of Nations as recognition for its respect for human rights. However, despite 
an early sense of nationalism among the population, the next several generations of Faisal 
Kings experienced growing unrest. In response to numerous uprisings, the kings as well 
as subsequent prime ministers began taking steps to consolidate power, largely 
transitioning the government to an oppressive autocracy. From the end of the monarchy 
in 1958 until the Ba’ath Party’s ascendancy to power in 1968, Iraq experienced numerous 
military coups responsible for the deaths of thousands of Iraqis.130 During the reign of the 
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Ba’ath Party, repressive actions continued, despite Iraq declaring itself a “People’s 
Democratic Republic.” Elections to ministries and cabinet position with the government 
of Iraq were subject to pre-screening for adherence to Ba’ath party ideals. Numerous 
constitutions were promulgated throughout this period, each reinforced the powers 
afforded to the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). From 1979 
through 2003, Hussein had effectively consolidated and retained control of Iraq.131  
Despite Hussein’s brutally oppressive nature and lack of regard for human rights, 
he had shaped people’s expectations for legitimate governance. During his reign, Hussein 
had implemented economic reforms and modernized industry. Further, Iraqis experienced 
a greater acquisition of wealth, increased social mobility, improved education, better 
access to healthcare, and more land ownership.132 Further, to generate goodwill, Hussein 
had provided oil subsidies, electricity, water, and other basic services; as a result, Iraqis 
retained an expectation for some of these basic provisions.  
Focusing on culture, Iraqi citizens recognize all three of Weber’s sources of 
legitimacy. The tribal structures and dynastic roots remained influential in Iraq, 
demonstrating legitimacy from traditional sources. Religious leaders of both Sunni and 
Shia sects had tremendous influence over the population, and the official religion of the 
country was Islam. The guiding role that religion plays in Iraq demonstrates the presence 
of Weber’s charismatic classification of legitimacy. Finally, Iraq had a functioning legal 
system that was used to administer justice. Although the system was corrupted under 
Saddam, the Iraqi population was familiar with constitutional law, demonstrating that a 
legal component shaped governmental authority in Iraq.133 
Within the established context of culture and historical precedence, the newly 
formed democracy in Iraq faced a steep legitimacy challenge. The GOI needed to strike a 
balance among the interests of the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish populations. Additionally, 
the development of security forces capable of protecting the population from the growing 
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number of insurgents, criminals, external fighters, and militia groups would also 
significantly increase. Ultimately, an Iraqi government that resisted external influences, 
minimized corruption, and embraced an equitable administration of justice would be 
afforded a degree of legitimacy.134 
However, from its inception through the evaluated period (2003-2006), the GOI 
suffered from the perception of illegitimacy. The perception has been that Shia 
representatives dominated the interim and newly elected government. Further, the United 
States supported these newly elected leaders as they set out to consolidate control over 
Sunni populations. Sectarian divides increased under the newly formed government to an 
unprecedented level. The increased focus on sectarian related issues detracted from the 
government’s ability to conduct meaningful reconciliation, and power sharing 
suffered.135 After becoming fully sovereign with an approved constitution, the 
government lacked the resources and ability to stop the violence from the insurgency, 
Shia militias, and criminal enterprises. Reconstruction efforts were plagued with 
corruption by Iraqi governing officials and contractors. Concurrently, the USG 
demonstrated a lack of “unity of effort” between the Department of State (DOS) and the 
Department of Defense (DOD). In 2006 inadequate security forces were available to 
“hold” territory to facilitate the subsequent reconstruction projects in the “build” phase, 
of the clear, hold, build construct.136 Much of the external support from the United 
States, as well as oil revenues, found their way to government officials as opposed to 
infrastructure projects. Furthermore, in a move the United States was largely complicit in, 
numerous individuals who were placed in the newly formed government were political 
exiles and/or had ties to extremist organizations—creating a disconnect between Iraqi 
politicians and the people at the local level who they represented.137 The political elite 
did not share the priorities of the people and therefore failed to provide for their basic 
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needs. In many ways the central government worked to suppress grass roots political 
movements, which were viewed as threats.138 
Additionally, the government created security forces at a proficiency level and 
pace insufficient to meet the challenges of state building while fighting an insurgency. 
Following the U.S. invasion and subsequent de-Ba’athification, Iraqi security forces had 
dissolved, aside from a few traffic police. The task of developing the police as well as the 
army ultimately became the responsibility of the U.S. military. The Iraqi Army (IA) 
received the majority of resources and training while the police were poorly trained, 
criminally corrupt and largely infiltrated by Shia militias. Moreover, all Iraqi security 
forces lacked the basic capacity to secure the population. Iraqi security force’s inability to 
provide adequate security is a function of sectarian issues among units and the Sunni 
militia’s resolve toward countering the predominantly Shia comprised Iraqi Army.139 In 
the early years of the U.S. occupation, it was clear that the United States failed to 
anticipate not only the ensuing insurgency but also the scope of reconstruction efforts that 
were required. To illustrate this point, early CPA assessments called for a 60,000 man 
Iraqi Army; the reality is that by 2006 the roughly 138,000 IA troops were still unable to 
secure the population.140 In response to the lack of security, Shia areas relied largely on 
militias for both security and basic services, while Sunnis were forced to rely on militias 
and groups like AQ and the Islamic State of Iraq for protection.141 
The government’s inability to lead and secure the population reinforced the 
widespread perception of illegitimacy. In some sectors, close ties to the United States 
served to detract from Iraqi sovereignty and legitimacy. As a whole, the Shia and Sunni 
populations both questioned the motives of the United States; although, the Sunni 
population expressed this sentiment to a greater degree.142 By 2006, intense corruption 
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still undermined the entire process, and the sectarian divides shifted the conflict in Iraq 
from an insurgency into a civil war, an escalation that reinforced the failures of the 
established government.  
2. Capacity to Deny Sanctuary 
A host country’s ability and willingness to deny insurgent sanctuary, and its 
corresponding support associated with that sanctuary, serve as a strong determining factor 
when supporting a host nation fighting an internal conflict. Denying sanctuary refers to 
the counterinsurgent’s capacity to contest the areas in which insurgents reside and receive 
support. Capacity and commitment toward this end should be measured in relative terms 
with an understanding that complete denial may be an unreasonable expectation. 
Sanctuary, in this research is discussed in general terms and encompasses a broader view 
than some literature suggests. With respect to external sanctuary and support, does the 
host government take measures to secure its borders? Does the government demonstrate a 
willingness to engage with neighboring states in which the sanctuary and support 
originates?  
In contrast to the first two cases, the insurgency in Iraq relied on sanctuary and 
support from major urban areas, specifically within the Sunni triangle,143 north and west 
of Baghdad. During the Hussein era, the Sunni Triangle contained the majority of the 
Ba’ath party, former military members, and internal guards known as the Fedayeen 
Saddam.144 Prior to the fall of the regime and the disbanding of the military, Saddam had 
prepared for a resistance by pre-positioning munitions and supplies in homes and 
mosques of the Sunni Arab sectors of Iraq. Furthermore, as Iraqi Army fighters dispersed 
during the invasion, they took their weapons with them. Those actions produced a well-
resourced and moderately trained insurgency.145 Internal to Iraq, insurgents were 
supported both socially and financially by personal relationships and tribal ties, legitimate 
Sunni businesses, and sympathetic mosques and religious leaders. Externally, sanctuary 
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was neither heavily relied upon nor essential. However, Syria did provide limited 
sanctuary to former Ba’ath Party leaders and turned a blind eye to smuggling 
activities.146 External support essentially filled the gaps in internal support. External 
supporters included expatriated loyalists and wealthy donors from Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Gulf States, and Europe. 
Although often referenced as the insurgency, AQ in Iraq prior to 2006 only comprised a 
small percentage of the Sunni fighters, while local Sunni militias and groups comprised 
the majority. 
The sectarian divide created conditions in which Iraqi security forces were unable 
to contest both Sunni social and physical sanctuary without extensive coalition support. 
Unfortunately, coalition forces neither anticipated nor prepared for the ensuing 
insurgency. Fallujah served as a significant safe haven for AQ until late 2004; as a 
function of the delayed coalition strategy, Sunni insurgents had the time and space to 
develop their networks and were well prepared for the upcoming coalition operation. In 
cases where large operations were conducted in Najaf (mid-2004), Fallujah (late 2004), 
and Tal Afar (mid-2005), U.S. forces mostly led the operations. However, operations in 
Tal Afar did demonstrate an increased IA and police capacity. Beyond security force 
challenges, the Iraqi government’s struggles to provide basic services made them 
ineffective at co-opting sympathetic Sunni populations. Sympathetic Sunni populations 
would not provide intelligence to security forces; from its inception, the government was 
unable to convince Sunni Arabs that it was not fixated on their destruction. These factors 
suggest that in urban areas, the GOI failed to provide sufficient security and essential 
services to the Sunni that would create the trust required to deny social sanctuary. 
The GOI and its security forces did not demonstrate the ability to effectively deny 
sanctuary to Sunni insurgents. Despite improved proficiency and noticeable shifts toward 
greater independence, IA actions largely fueled the resolve of both Sunni militias and 
AQ.147 Although violence increased in 2005–2006, joint counterinsurgency efforts did 
disrupt sanctuary. It is understandable that counterinsurgency capacity would grow with 
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time and experience, since both the security forces and the government were new. 
Unfortunately, IA sectarianism and a lack of national identity diminished early 
effectiveness of the IA. As a result the insurgency had time and space to grow.148 Within 
the ranks of the new security forces, former military members and Sunnis in general were 
not meaningfully represented. This lack of Sunni representation in the IA supported the 
perception that the army was essentially a government sponsored Shia militia. As a 
whole, the GOI lacked the capacity to deny sanctuary without extensive U.S. support, a 
situation that continued throughout the insurgency phase of the conflict. 
3. Iraqi Political Objectives 
Following the removal of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi objectives for governance 
appeared as unclear as U.S. reconstruction objectives. At that time, U.S. leaders sought 
input from Iraqi leaders who represented Shia, Sunni Arabs, and Kurdish perspectives. 
Problematically, the United States also relied on a large number of exiles to both shape 
priorities and serve within the GOI. As a result, priorities from exiles in some cases did 
not reflect the needs of the citizens. Shia and Kurdish populations sought to exact 
retribution on the Sunni’s—a fact demonstrated by their harsh administration of the U.S. 
initiated de-Ba’athification process.149 Despite disparate goals, the Transitional National 
Authority assisted by the CPA eventually developed and agreed upon an interim 
constitution that carried the government through 2004—the year Iraq officially re-
obtained sovereignty.  
By early 2005, Iraq had adopted a constitution that contained its official collective 
ideals and objectives. Throughout this process, the three major groups wanted to secure 
greater control to shape the future of Iraq. Formally, the Iraqi constitution outlines basic 
principles, rights and liberties, federal authority, powers of the federal authority, and 
powers of the regions or local governorates. The preamble of the Iraqi constitution 
specifies respect for the rule of law, justice, equality, human rights, diversity, the ending 
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of terrorism, and national unity.150 Although these goals are official, each of the three 
major groups had demonstrated varying degrees of effort toward achieving them. 
Following the 2005 elections, Kurdish politicians demonstrated familiarity with 
governance by their development and achievement of clear goals and by devotion to 
attaining Kurdish autonomy. Traditionally, Kurdish populations have strongly favored 
democracy and empowerment of regional governance and they have been more secular 
and more favorable to a U.S. presence in Iraq. Shia representatives comprised nearly 54% 
of the government in 2003.151 They had several prominent political parties, a factor that 
can be challenging when trying to obtain consensus. For Shia populations, national 
identity ranked first, closely followed by their identity as Shia. They strongly favored the 
democratic process because they were the largest group. As a whole, the Shia politicians 
advocated for greater integration of religion into governance. Sunnis were characterized 
as the strongest nationalists of the three groups, opposed occupation by foreign forces, 
and sought freedom from foreign influences. As much as they appreciated self-
determination, they did not believe that their needs would be fairly represented in the new 
government. Ultimately, amidst competing interests, the three major groups reached a 
degree of consensus by approving the constitution and participating in democratic 
elections.152  
4. Shared Political Objectives 
By 2003, President George W. Bush had adopted a doctrine of pre-emption. 
Under that doctrine, attacks would be justified against state and non-state actors if 
intelligence demonstrated significant future threats.153 Under the auspice of preventing 
the spread of WMDs, the United States invaded Iraq to remove Hussein. Beyond 
Hussein’s removal, the President articulated the following goals: 
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Our mission in Iraq is clear. We’re hunting down the terrorists. We’re 
helping Iraqis build a free nation that is an ally in the war on terror. We’re 
advancing freedom in the broader Middle East. We are removing a source 
of violence and instability, and laying the foundation of peace for our 
children and grandchildren.154  
Following the collapse of the Iraqi regime, U.S. strategic objectives were more 
specifically laid out in the president’s National Strategy For Victory in Iraq, and were 
referred to as the “eight pillars”: 
1. defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency 
2. transition Iraq to security self-reliance 
3. help Iraqis forge a national compact for democratic government 
4. help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services 
5. help Iraq strengthen its economy 
6. help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights 
7. increase international support for Iraq 
8. strengthen understanding of coalition efforts and public isolation of 
insurgents.155 
In several ways the president’s eight pillars mirrored several of the GOI’s 
objectives that were laid out in the new constitution. The GOI recognized the damaging 
effects that AQ and other groups posed to the country as a whole. Terrorists were not 
only killing Iraqis but also eroding GOI legitimacy. AQ highlighted the government’s 
inability to protect the population. Additionally, the majority of Iraqis truly desired a 
degree of self-determination through a democratic process.156 Both the USG and the GOI 
recognized that rebuilding the Iraqi Army was a critical component to establishing a free 
and democratic Iraq. As a result, the coalition as well as the GOI devoted significant 
focus and resources toward the IA’s training and development. Despite not being well 
planned or adequately resourced, reconstruction and development of public works 
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projects served as an additional shared objective. Nevertheless, these efforts were 
subverted on several levels, due to corruption in critical governance roles and an overall 
lack of security.157 
Differences between the goals of the GOI and the USG were more evident at the 
strategic level. Senior members in the Bush White House thought Iraq provided an 
opportunity to set an example in the region.158 However, Iraq was not as concerned with 
democracy serving as an example of stability for neighboring countries in the Middle 
East. Further, their regard for transnational terrorism did not extend beyond the ability to 
influence affairs inside Iraq. The GOI struggled to deal with matters internal to Iraq and 
had little enthusiasm to combat regional terrorism.159  
Determining the role of shared objectives in Iraq as a whole requires 
acknowledging the extremely complex human landscape. Despite a small number of 
universally accepted objectives, crucial differences remained among the Shia, Sunni, and 
the Kurds. Unfortunately, good intentions for equitable representation in governance 
elevated the importance of group identity and in turn diminished the sense of nationalism. 
As a result, sectarian divides served to overshadow the common ground that did exist. 
Furthermore, one the largest contributing factors initially fueling the Sunni insurgency in 
2003 was the U.S. occupation. As a result, by 2006, nearly half the population of Iraq 
approved of attacks against the United States military.160 Despite the United States’ 
contributions to creating a sovereign Iraq, its presence served as a source of friction for 
both Sunni and Shia populations. However, in spite of the negative perceptions of the 
United States, the Sunni “Awakening” of late 2006, brought together Sunni’s in the 
Anbar province with the U.S. military; Sunnis, assisted by U.S. soldiers, established local 
security to protect against the brutality demonstrated by both AQ and Shia militias. As a 
whole, the USG and the GOI shared seemingly appropriate objectives; however, securing 
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the population needed to be prioritized from the beginning. This inability to secure the 
population undermined the remaining objectives, and the three groups continued to rely 





Despite America’s status as a great military power, there are counterinsurgencies 
that may be beyond America’s capability to win. This analysis identifies three 
preconditions derived from extensive literature and examines their validity across four 
historical cases. Analysis of the salient points of each case finds that the critical factors 
identified—government legitimacy, ability to deny sanctuary, and shared political 
objectives—correlate with mission success. The Philippines and El Salvador are 
identified as successful counterinsurgencies, while Afghanistan and Iraq are deemed 
unsuccessful. 
A. LEGITIMACY 
The government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) demonstrated a 
moderate level of legitimacy before U.S. involvement and recognizing that within a 
democratic society reforms may be required. Reforms included the development of 
Muslim autonomous regions, decentralizing governance to the local level, and the 
introduction of programs designed to integrate former Muslim fighters into the armed 
forces of the Philippines (AFP). As a whole, the GRP’s legitimacy grew as the United 
States’ support and mentorship was incorporated into its counterinsurgency strategy.161  
To a lesser degree, the government of El Salvador made attempts to reform 
perceived injustices. Despite the attempts of the land-owning elite and entrenched 
military to retain control, democratic political parties and ideals became popular in El 
Salvador in the early 1980s. The success of the elections of 1984, combined with the 
failure of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) to garner wide-scale 
popular support during the conflict, confirm that the government demonstrated sufficient 
legitimacy.162 
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By contrast, the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) was 
built on an illegitimate foundation. A strong central government ran counter to Afghan 
cultural expectations, and the early focus on building the army to the neglect of the police 
weakened the government’s ability to secure the population. Both the government and 
security forces, most notably the police, demonstrated corruption beyond culturally 
acceptable levels. These factors led to a perception of illegitimacy. 
Much like the GIRoA, the government of Iraq (GOI) suffered a legitimacy crisis. 
The decision to conduct de-Ba’thification and exclude former military members from 
prominent positions in the military and government proved problematic.163 The newly 
formed government and military failed to secure the population and contributed directly 
to sectarian tensions. The population’s reliance on militias for protection underscores the 
government’s failures. Legitimacy was further undermined by the government’s 
sponsorship of Shia death squads and corruption beyond acceptable norms.164 
Governmental legitimacy was present in the Philippines and El Salvador, and 
absent in Afghanistan and Iraq. These cases support the hypothesis that a host 
government must be legitimate. Causal support is not asserted in this research; 
nevertheless, it is found that governmental legitimacy correlates with the success of U.S.-
supported counterinsurgencies.  
B. CAPACITY AND WILLINGNESS TO DENY SANCTUARY AND 
ASSOCIATED SUPPORT 
The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines enjoyed both physical and social 
sanctuary in the south; they also received external support from Jemaah Islamiyah and Al 
Qaeda. The Philippine government demonstrated a capacity to deny this sanctuary, using 
the AFP to disrupt the internal structure of the Abu Sayyaf group and deny access to 
external support. Although the Philippine government needed better tactics, it 
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demonstrated a basic capacity and willingness to disrupt insurgent sanctuary and 
support.165  
Sanctuary for the FMLN in El Salvador was considerable, both inside and outside 
the country. Before U.S. involvement, the El Salvador armed forces were known to 
employ death squads to assassinate FMLN leadership and supporters. In response, the 
FMLN “diplomatic core” operated from sanctuary given externally.166 The armed forces 
of El Salvador (ESAF) demonstrated a basic capacity to disrupt internal sanctuary and 
support; however, their capacity to disrupt external support was limited. Like the AFP, 
the ESAF was committed to counterinsurgency, but their faulty understanding of 
operations and indiscriminant tactics proved counterproductive on numerous occasions. 
Despite these early deficiencies, ESAF capacity to deny insurgent sanctuary was greatly 
improved through the addition of U.S. trainers and advisors.  
The harsh terrain and few roads in Afghanistan afforded the Taliban insurgency 
extensive opportunity for sanctuary and external support. Internally, the Taliban received 
significant social sanctuary in many places throughout Afghanistan. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to expect that security forces would be able to achieve desired outcomes 
without adequate prioritization and strategy. In Afghanistan, the training of the military 
and police was not a priority for the first eight years of the conflict. In addition, the 
Afghan army was built to mirror the U.S. military, with American-style weapons, 
vehicles, and equipment, which proved unsustainable, and Afghan security forces failed 
to demonstrate a willingness and ability to deny insurgent sanctuary and support. 
The creation of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) after the overthrow of Hussein 
posed extensive challenges. Early training and vetting of Iraqi Army (IA) members did 
little to identify and develop quality soldiers, and the lack of Sunni representation in the 
new army meant the IA was composed of predominantly Shia units.167 As the sectarian 
divide increased, persons in mixed neighborhoods migrated to Shia or Sunni 
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neighborhoods. This segregation, combined with a slow response by the ISF and the U.S. 
coalition, provided time and space for Sunni insurgents to fortify their physical and social 
sanctuaries,168 especially in the Sunni triangle, west and north of Baghdad. In the period 
evaluated, the Iraqi government and security forces were incapable of denying physical 
and social sanctuary. Even with their combined efforts, the United States Government 
(USG) and the GOI only achieved limited denial. By 2006, despite increased IA capacity, 
the Sunni insurgency was able to gain popular support and social sanctuary. In general, 
the government and security forces failed to demonstrate a willingness and capacity to 
deny sanctuary and support.  
The Philippine and El Salvador governments were willing and able to deny 
sanctuary and support, while Iraq and Afghanistan were not; the former were successful 
and the latter were unsuccessful. Although these cases do not establish causal support, 
they support hypothesis two: a capacity and willingness to deny insurgents sanctuary and 
associated support correlates to success in a U.S.-supported counterinsurgency. 
C. SHARED POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
The Republic of the Philippines demonstrated a sufficient commitment to critical 
shared objectives with the United States. Its focus on improving the capacity of the 
security forces to counter Islamic insurgency improved its effectiveness, reduced 
collateral damage, and facilitated development projects. Because U.S. forces were not in 
a position to conduct unilateral operations, U.S. objectives were ultimately accomplished 
through the GRP and its security forces. The GRP’s willingness to embrace U.S.-
encouraged reforms contributed greatly to increased popular perception of legitimacy, 
and ultimately to success. 
The Salvadorian government also shared sufficient objectives with the United 
States, though to a lesser degree. As in the Philippines, the United States Government 
(USG) focused on improving capacity through military advisors and aid, and the ESAF 
relinquished oversight to civilian authority, however reluctantly. The commitment by 
both countries to democracy facilitated peaceful transitions of power within the 
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government, and widespread popular support for the insurgency failed to materialize 
partly because of government progress.  
In Afghanistan, the GIRoA failed to select objectives that reflected the wishes of 
the people. Although official documents indicate that the USG and the GIRoA shared 
several objectives, commitment to these objectives was lacking, and the government did 
not represent the culture and ideals of its population. Ultimately, American strategy and 
Afghan lack of commitment both contributed to failure.  
In a similar fashion, the USG and the GOI shared several official objectives, but 
these were undermined by an inability to secure and protect the population. Beyond the 
lack of security, sectarianism between the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish populations severely 
degraded each parties’ progress toward shared objectives. The predominantly Shia 
government ignored Sunnis and their interests. Because the USG backed the GOI, the 
insurgents perceived the United States as an enemy. Given that the insurgency arose 
partly in response to the U.S. presence, it is unlikely that the majority of Iraqis will reach 
consensus on political objectives or that they will be compatible with U.S. goals. 
The requirement for shared political objectives as a precondition for success 
follows a familiar pattern. The Philippine and Salvadorian cases demonstrated sufficient 
shared objectives to reach acceptable outcomes; Afghanistan and Iraq did not. The latter 
were problematic in that both governments were newly formed and perceived as largely 
illegitimate. Inevitably, the governments’ objectives failed to encompass the ideals of 
their populations. The case studies support the hypothesis that the United States and a 
host government must share objectives. Although causation cannot be established, the 
evidence suggests correlation between shared political objectives and success in a U.S.-
supported counterinsurgency. 
This research concludes that the hypotheses that U.S.-supported 
counterinsurgency is likely to succeed when the host government is legitimate, denies 
sanctuary and support, and shares political objectives with the United States is affirmed, 
and that intervention is likely to fail if these preconditions are not present. 
 62
D. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF UNSELECTED PRECONDITIONS 
Even though only three of the five identified preconditions were analyzed across 
the selected cases, inferences can be made about the degree to which the two remaining 
preconditions influenced outcomes. Political and social will had seemingly little impact 
in the cases of the Philippines and El Salvador; conversely, domestic pressure did affect 
strategies and timelines in both Afghanistan and Iraq. During both conflicts, the United 
States experienced changes in presidential administrations and senior cabinet positions. 
Specifically, President Obama ran his campaign on a platform of ending the conflicts. 
Still, the United States continued operations in Afghanistan and returned to Iraq in 2014 
suggesting that political and social will did not play a central role. National identity also 
seemingly played a limited role in the Philippines and El Salvador. National identity 
challenges were far more pronounced in Afghanistan, as a result of the development of a 
strong central government. The GIRoA’s attempts to consolidate control from established 
local powerbrokers failed to engender a sense of nationalism. In Iraq, a sense of 
nationalism never materialized. The cases seem to validate the selection of the critical 
preconditions. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The author recommends greater vetting of potential partners before committing 
U.S. support to a counterinsurgency. Further, policy makers should be informed on the 
impact of the identified preconditions on U.S. supported counterinsurgencies. Moreover, 
when policymakers disregard this council, they should be prepared for a protracted and 
costly endeavor. Ultimately, regardless of the perceived national security interest of the 
country affected by insurgency, the absence of critical preconditions greatly diminishes 
the likelihood of an acceptable outcome.  
When a conflict transitions into a counterinsurgency, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
it is recommended that a reassessment of the identified variables should be made. If the 
host government is deficient in any critical preconditions, the United States should 
reevaluate acceptable outcomes or make the potentially unpopular decision to withdraw.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY LITERATURE REVIEW  
This appendix provides a broader review of the counterinsurgency literature to 
evaluate principles that shaped the understanding of critical preconditions for success in 
supporting a country affected by insurgency. The review is divided into general 
counterinsurgency principles and literature including specific cases. In the first section, 
the general principles of counterinsurgency, challenges associated with powerful nations 
countering insurgencies, and basic truths gleaned from both population- and enemy-
centric approaches are presented. The second section reviews literature on specific cases 
to draw conclusions about counterinsurgency warfare and their applicability in future 
cases.  
A. GENERAL COUNTERINSURGENCY PRINCIPLES 
According to the United States Counterinsurgency Guide, produced by the United 
States Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, care should be taken in determining 
whether the U.S. should partner with a host government. The initiative provides eight 
variables for consideration when assessing a potential partner: the “government’s 
character,” “bias,” “rule of law,” “corruption,” “civil–military relations,” “economic 
viability,” “presence of terrorist and transnational criminal organizations,” and “border 
security and ungoverned spaces.”169 
The first four considerations are essentially criteria for determining the level of 
legitimacy of an affected government. A common thread includes compatibility with U.S. 
values or objectives and willingness to undertake reforms. With regard to the last two 
considerations, that is, terrorists and transnational criminal organizations and border 
security and ungoverned spaces, a couple of points are made. First, the affected 
government’s response to terrorist and criminals in safe havens is important, because in 
most cases external occupying forces fuel local discontent and reactions that offset 
improved security. In addition, the security of borders and ungoverned space provides a 
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strong correlation to long-term success. Although it is acknowledged that external 
support can improve the capacity to secure borders and deny sanctuary, the host 
government ultimately must be capable of these tasks. 
The interagency-initiative consideration acknowledges that affected governments 
will generally not score well along several criteria (and that it is likely that external 
support would be unnecessary if they did score well). It is suggested that “affected 
countries with sound political, economic and social fundamentals but poor conditions are 
much more likely to respond well to assistance than one where fundamentals are poor, 
even if current conditions are not so bad.”170  
David Kilcullen outlines the disadvantages of an expeditionary force with respect 
to counterinsurgency warfare. Because an expeditionary force external to the conflict will 
not remain indefinitely, an insurgency has the advantage of time. Working with a 
legitimate host government becomes more critical under time constraints. Kilcullen 
provides four questions to assist a potential external supporter in deciding whether to 
become involved: 
1. What kind of state are we trying to build or assist? 
2. How compatible is the local government’s character with our own? 
3. What kinds of states have proven viable in the past, in this country and 
with this population? 
4. What evidence is there that the kind of state we are trying to build will be 
viable?171 
Kilcullen stresses that shared objectives are a key element in the decision to 
support an ally fighting an insurgency.  
Kilcullen’s book is divided into ground level and global perspectives on 
insurgencies. Principles and outlines are provided to ascertain how certain environmental 
conditions may impact the counterinsurgency efforts of an external actor. Initially, the 
argument is made that although the characteristics of a given situation may be similar to 
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other conflicts, solutions must be tailored to the environment to which they are applied. A 
clear understanding of core grievances and their importance to the population is 
necessary. Ultimately, building popular support is given a higher priority than killing the 
enemy; the main point is to alleviate suffering. Kilcullen believes that a COIN strategy 
should seek to attack the insurgent’s strategy more than the enemy himself. 
The challenges faced by an expeditionary force conducting counterinsurgency 
operations are compounded by cultural and physical distance from the conflict.172 The 
concepts of time and end states play an important role as well. Kilcullen states that in 
these scenarios, extraction or end-of-mission timelines must be kept secret. He looks at 
challenges in Afghanistan that were complicated by civilian and military counterparts 
who were tasked with maintaining a semblance of unity of effort.173  
Kilcullen describes counterinsurgency as a competition between a state and 
insurgents. The prize is legitimacy, which only the people can bestow.174 The case of 
Afghanistan shows that the Taliban shadow government maintained legitimacy in many 
areas because of its ability to provide services better than the central government in 
Kabul. Included in Kilcullen’s discussion are factors that have eroded government 
legitimacy in Afghanistan, including excessive corruption, a lack of government 
presence, an inept local justice system, and an election that was viewed as fraudulent by 
the majority of the population.175 Kilcullen concludes that Afghanistan has a legitimacy 
crisis, asserting that a bottom-up approach to governance is most likely to improve the 
rule of law and associated legitimacy.176 
Kilcullen emphasizes that a template for success in counterinsurgency operations 
does not exist. Despite the U.S. military’s desire for set routine, it is important that each 
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strategy be developed with a clear understanding of the conflict in which it is applied. A 
counterinsurgent force must adapt its strategy as the insurgency evolves.177  
In “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Kalev Sepp reviews 53 20th-century 
insurgencies that provide valuable data for counterinsurgents and external supporters of 
counterinsurgencies. He asserts that the focus of all civil and military efforts should be 
directed at the center of gravity; in the case of a counterinsurgency, this is most 
commonly the population and its support of the government.178 The focus on human 
rights and the provision of basic human needs must always be a part of the strategy. 
Counterinsurgent law-enforcement efforts and the targeting of insurgents is a primary 
method to protect the population by providing security. Common counterinsurgency 
tactics include the use of population-control measures that assist in separating insurgents 
from among the population. Further, the political process can be optimized through 
effective communication with the population by explaining how it can help the 
government. Included in the political process is the reintegration of insurgents into 
society. The best practices highlighted by Sepp include the securing of borders and the 
extension of special executive authorities during emergency counterinsurgency situations. 
Special executive authorities are deviations from established law or policy for limited 
periods to achieve a desired effect.179 
It is important to note the heavy emphasis placed on the role of the people by 
Kilcullen and Sepp. Many of their points refer to actions that are designed to address 
insurgent grievances or the population at large. The argument is that by addressing 
grievances, the government wins a greater degree of legitimacy and support from the 
population. The emphasis on this factor suggests the critical nature of legitimacy and 
implies that potential recipients of security-force assistance must exhibit a degree of 
legitimacy to be successful. Along the same line, a host government must be willing to 
conduct needed reforms. Finally, common perspectives on critical issues like meeting 
basic population needs is critical according to both Kilcullen and Sepp. 
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“Modern War: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice,” by Edward Luttwak, 
provides a harsh critique of modern U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. The article 
discusses counterinsurgency warfare in theory, counterinsurgency in practice in Iraq, and 
an easy way to defeat insurgencies everywhere. One of the specific points is that the U.S. 
has historically focused on providing basic humanitarian needs that insurgents are 
incapable of providing.180 This shows the American assumption that there is only one 
type of politics: one that focuses on popular support. Luttwak argues that methods 
harsher than those the United States would consider have been effective in past 
counterinsurgencies. He discusses several aspects of the U.S. approach in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that he perceives as inappropriate, but recommendations are not provided. 
His criticism relies on the availability of technical means for intelligence, a method that 
does not effectively separate or identify insurgents from among the population.181 In his 
conclusions, Luttwak identifies a disparity between America’s willingness to start and 
fight wars based on projected threats and its refusal to govern the conquered space, even 
for a limited time. He opines that in addition to governing as occupiers, the United States 
must be willing to employ harsh tactics182 
In his article, “Notes on Low Intensity Warfare,” Luttwak offers additional insight 
on the U.S. military’s organizational structure, identifying the greater military 
bureaucracy as operating effectively in large-scale, general-warfare scenarios. He 
believes that future wars will be mostly low-intensity conflicts. The military views these 
scenarios as a small-scale “real war”; the issue is that logistics, technical equipment, and 
general military might not be keys to success in irregular warfare. Luttwak lays out a 
continuum, at one end of which is “attrition-based warfare” and at the other, “relational 
maneuver-based warfare,”183 and argues that attrition-focused warfare describes 
conventional military combat. He observes that conventional forces seek to bring 
maximal resources and firepower to bear against the enemy as their primary means for 
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success, while those on the relational, maneuver end of the spectrum focus more on the 
environment, the conflict, and on adapting their processes to defeat the enemy through 
identified weaknesses. Luttwak suggests that military elements that focus inwardly, 
striving to optimize efficiencies and minimize risk through material innovation, lose site 
of the root cause of a conflict. The more ambiguous and complex the conflict, the less 
appropriate attrition-based organization becomes.184  
In Jeffrey Record’s article “Why the Strong Lose,” the ideas of Arreguín-Toft, 
Andrew Mack, and Gill Merom are examined to establish a baseline argument as to why 
stronger forces lose in irregular conflicts. In addition to the concepts of superior will, 
strategic interactions, and willingness to sacrifice, the inclusion of external support to 
insurgencies is provided as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for insurgent victory. 
Looking at the American irregular-warfare track record since Vietnam, Record identifies 
an inability to recognize conflicts as a means to political ends as a fatal flaw, claiming the 
United States fails to plan for what happens after achieving a military victory and 
demonstrates an aversion to preparing for counterinsurgency operations. This article is 
outdated in its reference to counterinsurgency, and focuses predominantly on unilateral, 
external efforts without referencing advising and assisting operations with host-nation 
security forces.185  
Record’s analysis seems to appropriately describe the United States’ 
unpreparedness to conduct counterinsurgency operation after their rapid military success 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, he references the critical nature of external 
support to insurgencies. The implication is that if the counterinsurgent can deny the 
insurgent critical external support, its chances for success are increased. 
In Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies Counterinsurgency, and the 
War on Terrorism, Daniel Byman draws the conclusion that when supporting 
counterinsurgency efforts, in many cases the changes required to promote the perception 
of legitimacy lie with the host government and its security forces. Byman points out that 
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reforms may pose a more direct threat to the government than the insurgency, and that it 
is common practice for host governments to accept the premise of reforms without 
subsequent follow through. The result is something other than a desired outcome. 
Further, Byman argues that U.S. support to a host government may make reform less 
necessary. The empowering of governments by U.S. support may put off land reforms, 
cleaning up corruption, and other measures perceived as a threatening to the government 
but effective against the insurgency. 
The greater implication of Byman’s argument is that there are certain occasions 
when U.S. support should be conducted from afar, as material or financial support. If the 
host government does not share the same objectives as the United States, it is unlikely to 
change its status quo. A call for realistic expectations is required when considering 
joining a counterinsurgency.186 
Andrew Mack provides several examples of asymmetrical conflicts that ended 
poorly for the stronger actor. His argument is that the political and social will to continue 
military action abroad becomes a decisive factor. Vietnam is offered as the most 
prominent example, with approximately 500,000 U.S. troops deployed to the region at its 
height. Beyond survival, the overarching goal of insurgents is to draw the adversary into 
a protracted war to increase its material costs and erode popular support at home.187 
In Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing 
Threat and Response, Steven Metz and Raymond Millen provide strategic considerations 
for U.S. support in countries affected by insurgency. They cite a need for understanding 
the differences between national insurgencies and liberation insurgencies, suggesting that 
that something similar to the “Powell doctrine” would help decide whether to commit 
support.  
In national insurgencies, governance and security forces exist, and in these cases 
legitimacy and capacity of the government and security forces are important. However, if 
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the host government does not share critical values with the United States, the ability to 
influence reform in either institution is limited. Without reform, success in this type of 
insurgency is unlikely. In revolution insurgencies, the movement arises out of a failed 
state and in response to an occupying power or newly formed government. In these cases, 
governments and militaries may not exist. As result, occupying powers must perform 
quasi-governmental functions until newly formed institutions are capable of assuming 
these roles. This admittedly nearly impossible task includes building new institutions 
without their being perceived as illegitimate proxies of the occupying power. If they are 
so perceived, they will not succeed, regardless of money, time, and material invested. 
Metz and Mullen suggest the United States consider a policy of containing insurgencies, 
as opposed to attempting outright victory.188 
In Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction, Joseph 
Celeski outlines the role of sanctuary in a triad of counterinsurgency warfare options (the 
others being time and will). Citing recent instances in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and 
Syria, Celeski describes the benefits associated with sanctuary, which refers to built-up 
basing in rural areas. Much of the discussion excludes rugged terrain, social sanctuaries 
and urban areas. Prescriptions for attacking a physical sanctuary and borders are 
provided, emphasizing diplomatic pressure on the country of origin and host-country 
indigenous operations to disrupt sanctuaries. Celeski concludes that the complete 
destruction of sanctuary is not required. Counterinsurgents can “succeed by disrupting or 
denying sanctuary and free border transit.”189 
In Indigenous Forces and Sanctuary Denial: Enduring Counterinsurgency 
Imperatives, Robert Cassidy asserts that sanctuary and external support are requisite for 
insurgent success and conversely, counterinsurgents most often must deny sanctuary and 
associated support to succeed. “If American led coalitions cannot deny or eliminate the 
sanctuaries of the global insurgent network and its supporters, we will not prevail in the 
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conflict.”190 The article references doctrine in the most recent counterinsurgency manual, 
which in numerous places discusses the importance of denying both internal and external 
sanctuary and support. The article focuses heavily on U.S. actions rather than host-
country responsibilities.191 
B. LITERATURE BASED ON SPECIFIC CASES 
In Chris Mason’s Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Will not Hold, and the 
Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, the inevitability of insurgent victory in 
Afghanistan is asserted. Mason’s analysis ranges from the tactical to the national strategic 
level, characterizing the Vietnamese, Iraqi, and Afghan conflicts, comparing security-
force numbers to insurgent numbers, and analyzing in detail why failure is inevitable. 
Mason predicts what Afghanistan will look like from 2015–2019 and covers lessons 
learned in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, concluding with recommendations. He 
expends considerable effort in arguing that Afghanistan has never been a nation or had a 
national identity, further explaining that police and security forces lack the ability and 
motivation to contest a committed insurgency. Afghanistan is essentially in a civil war in 
Mason’s estimate, with the implication that a majority consensus on legitimacy does not 
exist. He devotes considerable time in outlining where government legitimacy comes 
from, as discussed in Chapter I. In his conclusions, Mason explains the impossibility of 
nation building, outlines the challenges of state building, and claims peacekeeping is 
possible, but that coercive peace creation in a failed state is impossible.192 He argues that 
there are situations in which desirable outcomes are impossible, regardless of the strategy 
or time available.193 
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In Rothstein’s “Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an 
Era of Collapsing States,” the argument is made that the level of energy and attention the 
U.S. government focuses on a specific low-intensity conflict is inversely proportional to 
the effectiveness of that effort. Case studies in El Salvador, the Philippines, and 
Afghanistan are cited to substantiate this argument. An explanation of the American 
model of warfare is provided to demonstrate the consistent use of overwhelming numbers 
of soldiers and technologies. Rothstein articulates why small units of special-operations 
forces (SOF) are effective, if given the latitude necessary to focus limited resources 
toward winning irregular conflicts.194 
In his 2001 article “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric 
Conflict,” Ivan Arreguín-Toft critiques Andrew Mack’s relative-resolve theory and 
compares it with his own strategic-interaction theory. Strategic-interaction theory holds 
there are two strategic approaches to conflict: direct and indirect. The direct approach 
focuses on destroying an opponent’s ability to fight, while the indirect focuses on its will 
to fight. By examining the correlates of war data, Arreguín-Toft identifies that over time, 
stronger actors lose to the weak at an increasing rate of occurrence. Arreguín-Toft finds 
that the data supports three hypothesis in asymmetric conflict: that “strong actors are 
more likely to lose opposite approach interactions”; “opposite approach interaction last 
longer”; and “opposite approach interactions have increased in their occurrence in 
proportion to strong actor losses in asymmetric conflict.”195 Using Vietnam to test his 
strategic-interaction theory, Arreguín-Toft offers two requirements for the United States 
to fight and win asymmetric conflicts—a well-informed domestic population that 
understands the conflict will be long and the employment of armed forces equipped and 
experienced in counterinsurgency. If an ill-suited force is used, implying a poor strategy, 
a disaffected minority will become the disaffected majority.196  
In a 2013 RAND study titled Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern 
Insurgencies, Christopher Paul, et al. analyze 71 cases from 1944–2010. The study seeks 
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to provide best approaches for a successful counterinsurgency outcome. The analysis 
identifies three concepts present in all the successful cases examined: “tangible support 
reduction,” “commitment and motivation,” and “flexibility and adaptability of the COIN 
strategy.”197 None of the losing cases contains all three concepts. 
Basic truths from the study are offered as recommendations for future success as 
previously identified in Chapter I. Additionally, the study suggests that the modern 
classification of enemy-centric or population-centric counterinsurgency strategy overly 
generalizes the strategy and fails to provide significant insight for future participants in 
irregular warfare conflicts.198 In this study, addressing insurgent support was closely 
correlated with counterinsurgent success, suggesting that denying sanctuary and material 
support is more important than gaining popular support in some instances.  
In How Insurgencies End, Ben Connable and Martin Libicki analyze which 
conditions bring insurgencies to a conclusion. By recognizing indicators, leaders can 
select strategies that bring about “tipping points” in their favor. Chapter 3, in particular, 
addresses the effects of conflict duration and external factors such as insurgent sanctuary, 
outside intervention/external government support, and external insurgent support, 
examining how they affect the results of an insurgency. Using multiple cases to articulate 
each external factor, the study provides quantitative results for cases containing the 
external factors given, along with their correlation to the end result. The authors are 
careful to distinguish between correlation and causation. Although the study includes 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the results determine only the correlation of 
factors as they contribute to outcomes. 
The study does not outline paths to victory, but it does review basic truths 
inherent to irregular warfare, including durable insurgency/counterinsurgency resolutions 
as necessarily based on social, economic, and political justice. To end an insurgency, the 
government must address the root causes of discontent. Ultimately, “favorable endings 
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are produced from well-timed, aggressive, fully resourced, population centric campaigns 
that address the root-cause of the insurgency.”199 
In an edited compilation by John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein, “Afghan 
Endgames,” different scholars characterize legitimacy in several ways. The first focuses 
on the level of acceptance a government has from its population, noting it is not required 
to be democratic to be legitimate.200 The second, offered by Russell Muirhead, states a 
legitimate government is a “stable state that enjoys the voluntary support from most of 
the social groups that constitute the population.”201 By this description, legitimacy 
resides on a scale and is not necessarily measured in absolutes terms like 
“illegitimate.”202 Finally, Rob Reilly looks more toward an abstract meaning that 
indicates the justness of one’s cause, drawing a correlation between legitimacy and 
righteousness, invoking a moral component.203  
In Afghan Endgames, Understanding the Afghan Challenge, Arquilla and 
Rothstein observe that the United States still considers Afghanistan a critical location in 
preventing Al Qaeda resurgence, and claim a revised strategy is appropriate. Having 
clearly defined policy objectives from the outset of a conflict is desirable; however, many 
of these decisions are made with incomplete information and once made, become more 
difficult to adjust inside the American political realm. The authors propose that a range of 
acceptable outcomes be considered to allow greater flexibility in developing strategy. A 
centrality continuum is provided as a model for balancing desired outcomes with actions 
that portray a government as legitimate in their cultural context. In the case of 
Afghanistan, people respect the decentralized nature of governance, relying 
predominantly on religious and tribal leadership for political and social functions. The 
push for democratic reforms designed around a strong central government ran counter to 
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Afghan notions of a proper political arrangement. The desired outcome the United States 
pushed for—a strong central government—is widely viewed by the population as 
illegitimate. The assumption is that, at the outset, increased common ground between the 
newly formed government and the United States concerning political objectives and 
desired outcomes would have brought the GIRoA greater legitimacy and a greater 
opportunity to create stability.204  
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